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This paper presents a chronology of the 1995-96 farm bill debate, which was historic in 
several dimensions.  Victories in the 1994 mid-term elections gave Republican majorities control 
of Congress for the fIrst time in forty years.  An omnibus budget reconciliation bill became the 
principal vehicle around which the Republicans organized their political agenda.  In the highly-
partisan atmosphere that followed, the debate on farm policy centered on the level of spending, 
the structure of  the main commodity programs, and the programs for dairy, sugar and peanuts. 
The  initial  challenge  faced  by  the  new  agriculture  chairman  in  the  House  of 
Representatives was to find policies consistent with the election-year Republican rhetoric, while 
simultaneously putting together the committee votes to pass a farm bill.  A "Freedom to Farm" 
plan to eliminate annual acreage set asides and provide fIxed income transfers decoupled from 
production.  decisions and market prices became the centerpiece of  his proposals. 
Proponents of the traditional commodity programs seemed to hold a strategic advantage 
against the proposed decoupled payments through September 1995.  The Clinton administration 
had endorsed the traditional programs, and the Senate agriculture committee approved a bill that 
extended existing support mechanisms (with larger budget cuts than sought by the Democrats) 
after a reform initiative to lower target prices lacked Republican support.  Meanwhile, opposition 
to  Freedom to  Farm from  cotton and rice interests created an historic deadlock.  The  House 
agriculture committee did not pass any bill for inclusion in the budget  legislation. 
The strategic balance in the farm bill debate shifted when market prices increased sharply 
in late 1995.  The existing policy equilibrium continued to lose adherents and Congress passed 
the Freedom to Farm legislation in November.  When the Republican budget initiative (including 
the new farm policies) subsequently collapsed (in January 1996), a bipartisan coalition emerged 
to enact the Federal Agriculture Reform and Improvement (FAIR) Act, again including Freedom 
to Farm.  Notwithstanding the intervening steps, this may be the fIrst time ever that legislation 
included in a  budget reconciliation bill without approval  from  an authorizing  committee has 
become law. 
The budget reconciliation bill passed by Congress in November 1995 but vetoed by the 
president was credited rhetorically with reducing farm program expenditures by $12 billion over 
seven years.  But rising market prices by the time the bill passed implied that income transfers to 
farmers would be at least $3-5 billion more over the fIrst two years under the new legislation 
than they would have been with the 1990 law.  The strong bipartisan coalition in favor of the 
FAIR Act emerged  only  when  it  was  clear that  a  net  short-term  windfall  for  farmers  was 
involved,  and  with  continuation  of other  farm  policy  interventions  and  reauthorization  of 
environmental programs with new funding.  When the president signed the FAIR Act in April 
1996, the short-term benefIts of decoupled payments for farmers were larger than estimated the 
previous November.  Permanent legislation for  support programs based on supply controls is 
maintained in the F  AIR Act, and there is no guarantee that a transition to lower support costs has 
been initiated.  The dairy, sugar and peanut programs escaped signifIcant deregulation.  Thus, 
regardless of  claims that the F  AIR Act brings an end to farm programs that have existed since the 
Great Depression, the amount of  reform may well prove less than historic. What is Happening to U.S. Farm Policy: 
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A Chronology and Analysis of  the 1995-96 Farm Bill Debate 
The  recently  completed  debate  over the  1996  Federal  Agriculture  Improvement  and 
Reform (FAIR) Act has raised the  question of whether farm  policy  is  impervious to  liberal 
market-reform more than sixty years after the enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933.  Critics  have  long  argued  that  structural  changes  in the  farm  sector--decreased  rural 
population, technological  innovations,  capital-intensive production systems, integration of the 
farm and nonfarm economies, and rising per-capita average net incomes of  farm operators--have 
made existing agricultural policies anachronistic.  The prospects for agricultural policy reform 
seemed to be strengthened by the recent political imperative toward streamlining government, 
driven by pressure on the budget from medical and retirement entitlements.  In the 1994 mid-
term elections, Republicans won control of  both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
making the first time in 40 years that the Grand Old Party enjoyed such power.  The Republican 
(now majority)  leadership  expressed commitments to  devolution,  fiscal  discipline,  and  lower 
taxes.  Cuts in federal programs were implied by these commitments, and 73 freshman legislators 
converged on Washington with zeal for the mandates of their Contract with America, a broad 
agenda  that  the  Republican  House  candidates  had  endorsed  prior  to  the  elections.  Their 
philosophy of governance encompassed an expanded role for the private economy and aversion 
to failures of  the welfare state, principles that seemed to put the farm programs under scrutiny. 
Immediate farm-sector circumstances also seemed favorable for reform.  International 
agreements placed modest constraints on agricultural market interventions worldwide, supplies 
were tight, export markets had strengthened, and further negotiations to liberalize trade were in 
the offing.  The  strengthening of world market prices  induced by short  supplies and strong 
demand  during  1995  made  reform  relatively  painless for the main commodities  (feedgrains, 
wheat,  cotton,  and rice).  The high market prices created a  pool of billions of dollars once 
budgeted for deficiency payments that would not be made under policies in the 1990 farm bill. This created an incentive for budget chicanery.  To recapture the anticipated expenditures for 
income transfers to agriculture would require a change in the structure of  the payment programs. 
Taking all of this into account, one might conclude that unless farm policy is essentially 
impervious to  change,  the  confluence of long-term  structural  factors,  the prevailing  political 
climate, and proximate circumstances of the farm  sector in 1995  would lead to some reforms. 
But what did happen to farm policy and why and how did it happened? 
This paper presents a detailed chronology of the  1995-96 farm policy debate and some 
preliminary  conclusions  that  can  be  inferred  from  the  outcome.  Although  some  important 
reforms are incorporated in the new farm legislation, the results are not entirely heartening from 
the perspective of reforming agriCUltural  programs to  lower federal  expenditures or deregulate 
markets.  Only in the case of  deficiency payments and crop program bases has substantive reform 
survived the political process. 
Rhetorically, under the farm  policy provisions of the November 1995  Balanced Budget 
Act that was passed by Congress but vetoed by the president, farm program expenditures were to 
be reduced by $12 billion from projected levels near $56 billion (about 21  percent) over the next 
seven years.!  Short-term acreage set-asides were to be abandoned as a key instrument of  policy, 
planting decisions deregulated, and income payments decoupled from production decisions. 
The  elimination  of  acreage  set-asides  and  increased  planting  flexibility  the  new 
legislation provided were sensible reactions to strong market conditions, and generate efficiency 
gains on the order of 2-4 percent of  net farm income.  But, rhetoric aside, by the time the budget 
act was passed rising market prices implied that income transfers to farmers over the next two 
years might be as much as $3-5 billion more  under the new legislation than they would have 
been were 1990 farm program mechanisms left intact.  When the president signed the agricultural 
~  Agricultural spending falls broadly into three categories, with expected spending over the next 
seven years of $56 billion for  commodity and export programs, $10 billion for  conservation 
programs,  and  $11  billion  for  crop  insurance  subsidies.  The  budget and  farm  bill  debates 
focused mostly on potential cuts to expenditures on the commodity and export programs.  Budget 
cuts of  $12 billion would be about 15 percent of  the combined agricultural spending. 
2 legislation of  the FAIR Act in April 1996, the short-term fmancial benefit of  the new policies for 
farmers were even larger. 
If the prevailing strong market conditions continue,  support payment levels under the 
1996  legislation might remain higher than under the previous deficiency-payments  programs 
even in the outlying years.  This would further enhance the relative benefit farmers receive from 
the  new agricultural  policies.  If market conditions  weaken,  as  is  equally likely,  one has  to 
speculate whether or not the production reforms in the 1996 legislation will stick--they might not 
in an era in which congressional majorities will be contested and Democratic opponents of the 
new policies, who bemoaned the elimination of what they termed the "safety net" for farmers, 
may regain power.  If prices fall  and the reforms  are  rescinded,  the extra payments farmers 
received in 1996 and (likely) 1997 will amount to a pure windfall, for which taxpayers receive no 
offsetting  savings.  If prices fall  and the reforms  stick, the  new legislation could signal  less 
government intervention than equivalent market circumstances have in the past, with reduced 
future farm payments.  The reforms will be more substantive in these circumstances, but it still 
might be many years before taxpayers recouped the extra up-front outlays mandated for farmers 
by the 104th Congress.  Other reforms designed to increase the market orientation of  farm policy 
mostly fell by the wayside in the process of  enacting the new farm bill. 
Chronology of  the Farm Policy Debate 
The 1994-1996 debate over farm policy was historic in a number of dimensions.  After 
the  mid-term  elections  in  November  1994,  farm  programs  were  to  be  determined  by  a 
Republican-dominated  Congress.  An omnibus  bill  to  constrain  government  spending  and 
balance the federal budget became the principal vehicle around which the Republicans organized 
their political and legislative agenda for 1995.  The highly-partisan policy debates in which the 
two parties inevitably were to engage in this political setting played out in a microcosm on farm 
policy.  The newly-elected  Republican  majorities  were  not necessarily  going  to  extend  old 
Democratic farm programs unquestioningly, and Democrats rallied around defense of the past 
3 interventions.  Never before had the  budget process played so  prominent a role  from  such an 
early point in farm policy deliberations. 
The farm policy debate during 1994-95 centered on the level of farm program spending, 
the structure of the main commodity support programs,  and the policies for  dairy,  sugar and 
peanuts.  Some Republican leaders promised initially that the farm  sector would be cushioned 
from  reductions  in  direct  government  spending  by  lower  taxes  and  less  regulation,  and 
Republicans and Democrats spared over contentious legislation on a variety of environmental 
policies.  But consideration of environmental components of the farm  bill  lagged the budget 
process and came before the full Congress in quite a different form when the Republican budget 
initiative collapsed in January 1996. 
The  key  events related to the  debate on the  budget and  the  structure  of farm  support 
programs  can  be  divided  into  four  phases.  These  four  phases  are  characterized  by:  1) 
concessions to agricultural interests in the GA TT implementing legislation and the initial agenda 
of the  Republican  Congress  (October  1994-June  1995);  2)  emergence  of budget-savings 
proposals and spending-level proposals (June-September 1995); 3) rising market prices drive the 
congressional  farm  policy  outcome  (September-November  1995);  and  4)  collapse  of the 
Republican budget initiative (November 1995-January  1996).  Subsequently, with a new crop 
year imminent, expiration of  many farm programs authorized in 1990, and reversion to untenable 
1949 permanent legislation technically in the offing, a bipartisan coalition emerged in 1996 to 
push farm legislation through Congress independent of the budget act (January-April 1996).  A 
chronology of  the principal events of  the farm bill debate is shown in Table 1. 
GAIT Concessions and a Republican Congress 
Once  the  election  results  were  known,  the  political  repositioning  in preparation  for 
convening the 104th Congress began in earnest. With the Republicans having taken control of 
the  House of Representative and the  Senate, the  Clinton administration quickly  backed away 
from a 
4 Table 1.  Chronology of  Principal Farm Bill Events 
GATI' Concessions and a Republican Congress 
October-December 1994:  GAIT Implementing Legislation Agreements 
Election of  Republican Congressional Majorities 
February 1995:  Administration's FY96 Budget; Lugar's Reform Proposals 
May:  Administration's Farm Policy Guidelines 
June:  Senate and House Budget Resolutions; Conference Budget Resolution 
Budget-Savings and Spending-Level Proposals 
May:  Domestic Sugar Market Deregulation (Miller-Schumer) 
June:  Farm Freedom Act (Zimmer-Schumer) 
July:  Freedom to Farm Act (unsigned outline) 
August:  Freedom to Farm Act (Roberts) 
Agricultural Competitiveness Act (Cochrane and others) 
Farm Security Act (Senate Democrats) 
Rising Prices Drive the Congressional Outcome 
September:  Minimal Conditions (Lugar's press conference); Lugar's First Markup Bill 
Robert's Markup Bill 
Agricultural Competitiveness Act (Emerson-Combest) 
House Committee Deadlock 
October:  Senate and House Reconciliation Bills 
November:  Conference Budget Reconciliation Bill; First Partial Government Shutdown 
Collapse of  the Republican Budget Initiative 
December:  Veto of  Balanced Budget Act 
Second Partial Government Shutdown 
January 1996:  Republicans Acknowledge Budget Gridlock 
Emergence of  a Bipartisan Coalition 
January 1996:  Agricultural Market Transition Act (Roberts) 
February:  Senate Agricultural Reform and Improvement Act 
Agricultural Regulatory Relief and Trade Act (Roberts) 
Amended Agricultural Market Transition Act 
March:  The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act 
April:  FAIR Act signed into law 
5 proposal  (floated  by  its  budget  director  in  October  1994)  to  reduce  support  payments  to 
agriculture  by  as  much  as  $16  billion  over  five  years.  Instead,  during  the  negotiations 
surrounding  passage  of implementing  legislation  for  the  1994  GAIT Agreement  (during  a 
special lame-duck session of Congress in December) the administration committed to seeking 
funding for export programs at the GAIT-maximum levels· and to minimizing future budget cuts 
for agricultural support programs. 
Consistent with these commitments, the president's February 1995 budget was supportive 
of agriculture.  Declining expenditures on deficiency payments were  anticipated from  strong 
demand and administrative actions to extend the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), but the 
only budget discipline was  inclusion of unspecified changes in policy to  reduce  Commodity 
Credit  Corporation  (CCC)  outlays  by  $1.5  billion  in  the  out  years  1998-2000.  These 
administration positions were reiterated by the new Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, in 
his March confirmation hearings.  An eighteen year veteran of Congress from Kansas, Glickman 
promised to be "an advocate for agriculture." 
The administration followed up in May with guidelines for farm policy.  The guideline 
called for maintaining the traditional program structure of  target prices and loan rates, modified 
by a phase-in of flexibility that would allow farmers to plant their base acreages to alternative 
crops without losing program benefits.  In a concession to the prospect of fiscal pressure beyond 
the  president's  budget  proposals,  the  guidelines  acknowledged  that  "needed  reductions  in 
outlays" could be achieved by increasing the percentage of nonpayment acres beyond the  15 
percent stipulated in the 1990 farm bill.  The administration also endorsed extension of  the CRP, 
with additional enrollments through 2000 of the "most environmentally sensitive land."  With 
these and other commitments to maintaining projected farm spending and the traditional program 
structures,  the  administration  precluded  itself  from  taking  a  leadership  role  in  seeking 
fundamental change in the commodity programs, although it did endorse a range of  proposals for 
modest reforms. 
6 A much more aggressive reform agenda was espoused by the new chairman of  the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Richard Lugar (R-IN).  After the November 
1994 election,  Senator Lugar signaled his  intent to  take a  hard  look at  farm  policy.  Lugar 
followed with a proposal for substantial reform.  He recommended that $15 billion be saved from 
anticipated  expenditures  by  lowering  target  prices  three-percent  per year  for  five  years  and 
eliminating the Export Enhancement Program (EEP).  Lugar held a series of  hearings in February 
and March 1995 to highlight his critical views.  The hearings, however, served just as much to 
demonstrate the lack of support for his proposals among members of his committee from either 
party. 
The  dispute  about  agricultural  policy  spilled  over into  the  Senate  budget  committee, 
which took up the Republican's omnibus balanced budget legislation as a basis for turning their 
election victory into a functioning policy agenda.  A Senate budget resolution in May set broad 
spending  objectives  to  balance  the  budget  in  seven years  based  on February  1995  baseline 
projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  The Senate budget resolution called for 
elimination of the federal deficit without raising taxes; nor were taxes lowered.  For agriculture, 
Lugar's proposed budget cuts were rejected as too severe.  Recommended reductions of  spending 
for agricultural programs were $8.8 billion over five years and $11.8 billion over seven years. 
The new chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, Pat Roberts (R-KS), was a 
longtime defender of support programs for  agriculture.  Drawing a  contrast to Lugar, whose 
proposal for a substantial reduction in expenditures was coupled with his call for a thorough 
reevaluation of  the program's objectives and structure, Roberts indicated that he wanted to "take 
a look at what works and build from there" (Agricultural Law Letter, January-February, 1995). 
Roberts' defense of existing programs rested in part on the argument that agricultural 
budgets had been reduced more than proportionately compared to other government outlays since 
7 1985.
2  Acknowledging the conservative momentum in the House of Representatives after the 
November elections, he cautioned farm interests that they should nevertheless anticipate further 
budget cuts.  He  also  articulated the  potential  benefits  for  farmers  from  the  full  Republican 
agenda.  The  negative  effects  of agricultural  budget  cuts  would  be  offset  within  an  overall 
package of deficit reduction by lower taxes and interest rates, and by regulatory and tax reform 
that would be targeted toward farmers specifically. 
At the annual meeting of  the American Farm Bureau Federation in January 1995, Roberts 
outlined his  objectives  within the  framework  of the  Republican  agenda:  first,  to  ensure that 
commodity programs were not singled out for disproportionate cuts; second, to ensure that the 
spending cuts went toward deficit reduction not other programs;  and,  third, to  seek relief for 
farmers  from  the  "tidal  wave  of environmental  mandates."  Roberts  developed  these  three 
objectives into a "policy ledger" for agriculture.  On the negative side were less federal support 
expenditures  and,  possibly,  reform  of  domestic  supply  restrictions  for  import-protected 
commodities such as sugar and peanuts.  Offsetting these "negatives" would be beneficial farm 
program reforms (elimination of annual acreage reduction program (ARP) set-asides, increased 
planting flexibility), continuation of the CRP, regulatory reforms (wetlands, endangered species, 
coastal  management,  private  property  protection,  costlbenefit  analysis  applied  to  regulations, 
elimination of unfunded  mandates,  science-based  risk  assessments),  and  tax  reforms  (lower 
capital gains taxes and health-care deductions for farmers and other self-employed persons). 
Despite his endorsement of the Republican agenda, Roberts led efforts in Congress to 
defend existing programs under the jurisdiction of the  House agriculture committee.  His first 
success was to insulate the federal  food  stamp program from the commitment in the Contract 
with America to turn many  federal  welfare  programs over to the states in the form  of block 
grants.  In late February, after a contentious  14-hour session to mark up  legislation, Roberts 
2  In making this argument, Roberts and other defenders of farm programs ignored the fact that 
expenditures  for  farm  support were  particularly  high  in  the  mid  1980s--partly due  to  stocks 
accumulated when loan rates were too high as the U.S. dollar appreciated from 1981 to 1985. 
8 announced agreement with the House leadership to retain food stamps as a federal  entitlement 
program. 
Roberts also did some homework in political calculus.  He concluded that 33  of the 76 
freshman  Republican  members  of the  House,  including  24  who  had  defeated  Democratic 
incumbents, came from districts with significant agricultural activity.  Reminding his colleagues 
of past election defeats when the Republicans had not supported farm spending, he prepared a 
strategy to convince the Republican leadership that its hold on a House majority could depend on 
taking a supportive approach to agriculture. 
3 
While the Clinton administration had positioned itself after the  mid-term elections to 
support only marginal changes to the budget and structure of existing programs for agriculture 
(and more broadly), and Senate Republicans emphasized budget discipline, the new Republican 
majority in the House of Representatives sought to make good on its campaign pledge to enact 
major portions of  the Contract with America during the first one hundred days of  the Congress. 
To fulfill part of this commitment, the House Republicans approved tax cuts of $353 billion in 
their balanced budget resolution.  With the tax cuts, greater reductions in aggregate expenditures 
were required to balance the House budget than in the Senate.  The House budget committee 
originally targeted  agriCUltural  spending  for  the  substantial  level  of cuts  Senator  Lugar  had 
proposed.  Roberts attempts to defend farm program spending faced potentially strident budget-
committee and floor opposition.  On his own committee, Representative John Boehner (R-OH), 
chairman of the House Republican Conference, also represented the party leadership and led a 
group of  reform-oriented members. 
Despite the opposition, Roberts and others had whittled the proposed agricultural cuts 
down from $16 billion to $12 billion over five years by May 4 when House budget committee 
,chairman John Kasich (R-OH) called a Republican retreat to review his proposals before a public 
3  Historically, Republicans attributed election losses in the 1940s and 1950s to opposition to 
their farm policies. 
9 markup session.  Agricultural representatives missed the opening meeting of the retreat to hold 
their own caucus.  In  subsequent negotiations,  Roberts  and  Kasich  bantered around a  figure 
between the budget committee proposal and cuts of only $5 billion.  They settled on a cut of $9 
billion over five years and a much larger cut of $17 billion over seven years.
4  By the time the 
budget  resolution  was  passed  on  the  House  floor,  Roberts  had  also  obtained  a  nonbinding 
amendment providing an escape clause from the budget cuts.  S 
The differing Senate and House budget resolutions went to a conference committee on 
June  8,  1995  and  a joint resolution was  completed by  late  June.  The  conference committee 
compromised on tax cuts, agreeing to  lower taxes by  $245  billion once the CBO certified that 
Congress had produced a legislative package projected to achieve a balanced budget by 2002. 
The joint resolution did not fully resolve the level of the spending mandates for farm programs 
because different instructions were provided to  the  House  and  Senate agriculture  committees. 
The House adopted targets that implied a reduction of budgeted expenditures on agriculture of 
$8.5 billion over five years and $13.4 over seven years.  In the Senate, only aggregate savings by 
the agricultural committee from farm and nutrition programs were specified ($29.2 billion over 
five years and $48.4 billion over seven years). 
The joint budget resolution also provided only initial guidelines for farm policy because 
no  details were included about how the mandated budget cuts would be obtained.  Within the 
4  David Maraniss and  Michael  Weisskopf give  a detailed  account of negotiations during the 
Republican  retreat  in  their  article  "Aggies  and  the  Road  Gang  Crunch  the  Numbers" 
(Washington Post, 5/26). 
S  The amendment stated that reductions for agricultural programs for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 
would be "re-examined" if land values on January  1,  1998 were  less than 95  percent of their 
values on the date of adoption of the resolution, relief in the areas of wetlands regulation, the 
Endangered  Species  Act,  private  property  rights,  and  cost-benefit  analysis  of proposed 
regulations were not enacted into law, new legislation had not been enacted providing capital 
gains tax reductions, increased estate tax exemptions, and mechanisms for averaging income for 
tax purposes, or if there had been any U.S. government interference in international markets or 
NAFT  A, GAIT and other international trade agreements had not lowered export subsidies and 
reduced import barriers of  foreign governments. 
10 budget parameters, attention would now tum to policy specifics.  The near unanimity with which 
agricultural  constituency  groups  had  petitioned  Congress  to  minimize  the  aggregate  budget 
reduction would break down as various competing interests were pursued.  Moreover, unlike the 
budget resolution, the subsequent budget reconciliation bill with its detailed policies to meet the 
spending mandates would require a presidential signature to become law.  For the Republicans to 
succeed  on  their  budget  plan  and  policy  reforms  would  eventually  necessitate  some 
accommodation of  the priorities of  the Clinton administration and the Democrats in Congress. 
Budget-Savings and Spending-Level Proposals 
The early tone of  the agriCUltural policy debate was set partly by legislation introduced by 
severe critics of  the existing programs.  Representatives Dan Miller (R-FL) and Charles Schumer 
(D-NY)  organized  almost  100  cosponsors  for  a bill  to  terminate  the  domestic  sugar support 
program.  During negotiations over the  1995  agricultural  appropriations bill, they obtained a 
promise from Roberts to allow a vote -on their proposal when the farm  bill reached the House 
floor. 
In June, Representatives Dick Zimmer (R-NJ) and Schumer introduced legislation titled 
the Farm Freedom Act.  It phased out deficiency payments by lowering target prices five-percent 
per year for five years (a similar approach to Lugar's proposal).  Aggregate outlays for deficiency 
payments  were  capped  during  the  transition  period  and  eliminated  in  the  sixth  year.  The 
sponsors claimed that over five  years  their proposal would save $29 billion and end income 
transfers to farmers. 
The spending mandates of  the Senate and House agriculture committees lay between the 
extremes of  the Clinton administration's budget and the Zimmer-Schumer bill.  Republican and 
Democratic members of  the committees began work on proposals within this scope. 
The Freedom to Farm Act 
One option that circulated around the House agriculture committee in early June was an 
unsigned three-page outline of  a reform proposal titled the "Freedom to Farm Act."  Compared to 
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some level of budget savings, the Freedom to Farm Act stood the budget process on its head.  It 
focused on insuring that farmers received the full level of  spending projected in the CBO budget 
baseline of  February 1995, less the mandated budget cuts. 
The outline of the  Freedom to Farm Act presented  a  simple  alternative  to  existing 
support programs for the feedgrains, wheat, cotton, and rice.  Over a seven-year period, farmers 
would receive a capped entitlement totaling $43 billion, which was the CBO baseline spending 
projection less the $13.4 billion reduction stipulated in the budget resolution.  A portion of this 
entitlement would be spent on EEP, and the remainder would be paid to individual farmers based 
on their participation in support programs over the past five years.  To remain eligible, farmers 
would have to comply with the conservation compliance provisions of previous law.  But the 
Freedom to  Farm payments would  be  made regardless  of market prices  and  independent of 
production decisions; they would be decoupled from economic activity on the farm.  Farmers 
would be free to make production decision based on market price signals, without concern about 
maintaining a program base or fulfilling ARP requirements.  The payment contracts would last 
for a seven year ''transition'' period, with the aggregate annual expenditure cap falling one-third 
from $7.6 billion in 1996 to $4.96 billion in 2002.  A minimal safety net would be provided by 
retaining nonrecourse loans at 70 percent of  the Olympic (dropping the highest and lowest years) 
moving average of past prices (instead of 85  percent under the  1990 farm  bill).  A  national 
commission was proposed that would evaluate the effects of these reforms by 1998 and make 
recommendations about the appropriate long-term role of  the government in agriculture. 
The simplicity of  the Freedom to Farm outline allowed its  advantages and shortcomings 
to be  readily identified.  Like Zimmer and Schumer's similarly titled Farm Freedom Act, the 
Freedom to Farm Act provided budget disciplinarians with a firm cap on future farm program 
expenditures. 
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and provided more immediate production flexibility.  The decoupled payments guaranteed under 
the Freedom to Farm Act insured producers of a seven-year contractual income stream.  Market 
prices had  strengthened throughout  1995  and  carryover stocks were projected to  be at nearly 
historic low levels at the end of  the year, implying prices would remain strong for at least another 
year.  This made the guaranteed payments under the Freedom to Farm Act lucrative in the short 
run compared to deficiency payments, which were likely to  be smaller under existing law or 
similar legislation continuing the deficiency payment mechanisms than had been projected by the 
CBO four months earlier. 
The windfall payments under the Freedom to Farm Act were particularly appealing to the 
chairman of the House agriculture committee.  In July,  1995, his Kansas constituents faced the 
prospect of having  to  repay  advance  disbursements  of deficiency  payments  because of high 
market prices, but they had suffered fairly extensive crop losses which lowered their expected 
income ..  Revised  projections  since  the  February  CBO  baseline  also  suggested  strong  farm 
exports  and  future  prices  in  the  outlying  years.  This  compounded  the  potential  short-term 
windfall, although with less certainty. 
Decoupling of  support payments from market prices under the Freedom to Farm proposal 
also  finessed  a budget-process obstacle to  eliminating the  annual  ARPs,  as  favored  by many 
farmers, processors, and other critics of supply controls under existing farm programs.  As long 
as farm  payments remained tied to  production, the  CBO  scored eliminating the set-asides as 
raising government costs because more acres became eligible for  payments and market prices 
might be lowered.  Since the CBO included ARPs for com and cotton in its baseline projections, 
the  agriculture  committees  were  informed  that  eliminating  set-asides  would  be  evaluated  as 
increasing the cost of  farm support programs by nearly $6.5 billion--an additional 50 percent of 
the budget savings required from farm programs by the budget resolution.  Under budget rules, 
this additional cost would have to be offset by other savings if the set asides were eliminated 
13 under existing program mechanisms.  Most analysts considered the CBO set-aside projections 
unrealistic given the strong market outlook that had developed by July.  But the budget scoring 
issue remained a tangible obstacle to achieving production-enhancing reform by eliminating the 
authority for ARPs.  The Freedom to Farm Act fmessed this constraint by decoupling payments 
from production and prices. 
Given its producer and budget-process advantages, the Freedom to Farm outline received 
some interest as a budget reconciliation proposal, despite its radical break with past policies.  The 
unsigned proposal appeared to have been circulated by the staff of  the House Republican Policy 
Group, a leadership group that included Roberts.  Widely viewed at first as a trial balloon, by late 
July  the  proposal  seemed  to  have  staying  power.  On  August  4,  1995,  Roberts  formally 
introduced the Freedom to Farm Act, co-sponsored by Representatives Boehner, Bill Barrett (R-
NE),  chairman of the  General  Farm  Commodities  Subcommittee,  and  Michigan  agriculture 
committee members Hostettler and Smith. Roberts indicated he would spend the congressional 
break advocating his legislative proposal and gauging reactions from producers before holding a 
formal markup session of  the agriCUlture committee in September. 
The  August  version  of the  Freedom  to  Farm  Act  stipulated  that  the  capped  total 
expenditures  (less  EEP  funding)  would  be  distributed  as  transferable  individual  contractual 
payments that would presumably be insulated from future budget decisions by Congress.  The 
payments would be proportioned among the program commodities on the basis of  shares of 
previous payments for "deficiency payments, loan deficiency payments and gains realized from 
repaying loans at a  level less than the original level, and marketing certificates."  Individual 
farmers would receive payments based on their 1995 program yields and base acreage for three 
of the years 1991-1995.  Payments were to be limited to $50,000 per person, a more stringent 
limit than existed,  with tightened  regulations  to prevent circumvention.  Planting  flexibility 
provided on base acres excluded fruits  and vegetables,  unless  designated specifically by the 
secretary  of agriculture,  and  gave  the  secretary  authority  to  prohibit  planting  of other 
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contract  would  be  eligible  for  nonrecourse  loans,  as  would  oilseeds  and  rye  grown  by  any 
producer.  The Freedom to Farm Act ended the voluntary annual set-aside programs (0/92,85 and 
50/92,85),  terminated the  authority  for  the  existing  cotton and  rice  programs  (that  had  been 
extended through 1997 in the 1993 budget reconciliation legislation), and suspended, but did not 
revoke, relevant sections of  the 1938 and 1949 agricultural legislation for the 1996-2002 period. 
No  provisions were  included  for  the  CRP,  nor  were  provisions  included  for  dairy,  sugar or 
peanuts. 
Senate Bills 
In the  Senate,  the agricultural  policy  proposals  moved  in  quite  a  different  direction. 
Lugar did not reassert his  early  budget-saving  reform proposals and  hinted that  only  modest 
changes in existing programs might be required.  While the chairman delayed, Senator Cochrane 
(R-MS)  and  14  cosponsors--including  Helms  (R-NC),  Warner  (R-VA)  and  Craig  (R-ID)  and 
Prior  (D-AK)  from  the  agriculture  committee-introduced  a  traditional  farm  bill  titled  the 
Agricultural  Competitiveness  Act  of 1995.  The  Cochrane  bill  (as  it came  to  be  known) 
characterized policy as being at a crossroads of "whether the U.S.  agricultural economy will be 
offered  up  to  satisfy  ideology,  leaving  U.S.  farmers  to  compete  on  their  own  against  the 
treasuries of  foreign governments."  Even so, its sponsors reluctantly acknowledged the necessity 
for reduced spending on agriculture. 
To  achieve  budget  savings,  the  Cochrane  bill  increased  nonpayment  acres  from  15 
percent to 25  percent for the supported program crops.  In most other ways, the Cochrane bill 
extended  existing  law.  The  support  programs  remained  an  uncapped  entitlement  and  the 
mechanism of deficiency  payments  tied  to  production  of specific  crops  on established  base 
acreages was retained.  The Cochrane bill addressed the interests of some farmers in increased 
planting  flexibility  by  allowing  farmers  to  plant  up  to  100  percent  of their  base  acres  to 
alternative  crops  and  to  plant  program  crops  on  25  percent  of their  historic  soybean  acres. 
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produced but they would not be penalized by a reduction in eligible base acreage.  Any output of 
program crops would be eligible for nonrecourse loans. 
The Cochrane bill also included traditional provisions for sugar and peanuts.  The support 
price was maintained at its  1995  level of $O.18nb  for raw cane sugar.  In place of marketing 
allotments, producers were required to implement a surplus stocks program that would insure 
that the U.S. minimum import commitments under GAlT were met and domestic prices were 
supported at no cost to taxpayers.  The peanut price support level was also maintained, with the 
secretary  of agriculture  given  latitude  to  lower  the  national  poundage  quota  receiving  the 
domestic price  support in order to  reduce  government program costs.  These modest reforms 
were accepted by sugar and peanut producers as minimal steps necessary to forestall the more 
dramatic reforms--particularly reduced support price levels--called for by critics of  the programs. 
With its comprehensive provisions for maintaining existing programs, the Cochrane bill 
became  a  rallying  point for  producers of the  southern  commodities  (cotton,  rice,  sugar  and 
peanuts) and others interested in maintaining the traditional program structures and minimizing 
budget reductions in agriculture.  The budget savings of the Cochrane bill were estimated to be 
less than $5 billion over seven years.  The sponsors hoped to shift some of  the remaining budget 
reduction  requirements  of the  Senate  agriculture  committee  onto  nutrition  programs,  but 
acknowledged that agricultural  programs might need  to  be  further  modified  "as  necessary to 
comply with applicable budget reconciliation instructions."  The future of the CRP and dairy 
policy were not addressed in the initial Cochrane bill. 
Senate Democrats on the agriculture committee, led by the Minority Leader Tom Daschle 
(D-SD) also outlined a farm policy proposal before the August 1995 congressional break.  Their 
Farm Security Act of 1995 established a two-tier payments mechanism for wheat and feedgrains. 
Increased planting flexibility was incorporated by combining separate commodity acreages into a 
single farm base.  Payments were targeted to mid-sized farms by limiting the quantity of output 
16 that would be eligible for deficiency payments.  Additional output from base acreage would be 
eligible for CCC loans at a rate raised to 95 percent of  the five-year Olympic moving average of 
market prices.  Total expenditures on farm programs would be restricted to $7 billion per year, 
resulting in a saving of  $4 billion from the CBO baseline projections. 
The  policy  proposals  of the  Senate  Democrats  differed  from  those  of the  Clinton 
administration,  but  the  president  had  revised  his  budget  proposal  in  June  to  counter  the 
Republican congressional agenda.  His June  budget also endorsed savings of $4  billion from 
agriCUltural  programs--using projections from  the administration's Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) instead of  the CBO. 
By  raising  the  loan  rate,  the  Senate  Democrat's  bill  recoupled  support  payments  to 
production, a policy change diametrically opposite to the decoupled payments of  the Freedom to 
Farm Act.  If  market prices fell, higher loan rates could potentially lead to unanticipated levels of 
CCC  expenditures since  loans could be  repaid  at  the  loan rate or the  prevailing market price 
level.  The Democrat's bill gave the secretary of agriculture the authority to impose acreage set-
asides  or  otherwise  modify  program  parameters  if projected  expenditures  exceeded  the 
authorization, so it retained a strong element of supply management. 
Rising Prices Drive the Congressional Outcome 
As Congress left Washington for its August recess, the farm policy options had come into 
focus  around the initial proposals.  It was now clear that the partisan character of the  budget 
debate would cast a heavy shadow on the farm bill deliberations.  Despite the differences in their 
policy prescriptions,  House  and  Senate  Democrats  positioned themselves  behind the  Clinton 
administration's  gradualist approach to  reducing  the  budget deficit.  This put the burden on 
Republican leaders to pass farm policies fitting their budget mandates on essentially party lines. 
The Republicans had only a 10-8 majority on the Senate agriculture committee, so unanimity 
would be required to pass a bill over Democratic opposition.  In the House, the Republicans held 
a 27-22 advantage on the agriculture committee. 
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Negotiations on farm policy among the Republicans on the Senate agricultural committee 
were  unsuccessful  through  August  and  early  September.  As  a  September  29  deadline  for 
meeting  the  instructions  for  the  budget  reconciliation  bill  approached,  Lugar  held  a  press 
conference to announce that no consensus had been achieved.  He declared that he would insist 
on four reforms in agriculture.  These reforms were that budget savings would have to reach a 
minimum level of  $13.4 billion, authority for ARPs would have to be eliminated (or at least their 
use  projected to be  negligible),  increased planting flexibility  would have to be provided, and 
support for sugar and peanuts would have to be reduced commensurate with the reductions faced 
by other commodities. 
House Gridlock 
In the House, Roberts had hoped to return to Washington with momentum in support of 
the  Freedom  to  Farm  Act.  He  won  praise  from  national  and  regional  newspapers  and  an 
endorsement from  the  Kansas  Farm  Bureau  but  other  organizations  remained  noncommittal. 
Neither the American Farm Bureau Federation nor any of the national commodity associations 
endorsed his proposals. 
Roberts also met with stiff opposition, particularly from  cotton and rice producers and 
processors.  On September 15, Representatives Bill Emerson (R-MO) and Larry Combest (R-
TX) introduced a farm bill modeled closely on the Cochrane bill in the Senate.  The Emerson-
Combest  bill  retained  existing  support  mechanisms  tied  to  production of specific  crops  and 
included  program  modifications  supported  by  sugar  and  peanut  producers.  Emerson  and 
Combest  acknowledged  the  imperative  of achieving  the  $13.4  billion  budget  savings  the 
committee had been assigned.  In their bill, they proposed raising nonpayment acres from  15 to 
30 percent to achieve savings of $8.9 billion.  Additional savings of $2.5 billion were claimed 
from reforms to the voluntary annual set-asides, dairy supports, and the peanut program.  Savings 
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similar to proposals expected from Roberts. 
Introduction  of the  Emerson-Combest  bill  potentially  gave  a  strategic  advantage  to 
supporters  of the  existing  commodity  programs.  The  Clinton  administration's  farm  bill 
guidelines,  the  Cochrane bill  in the  Senate,  and the Emerson-Combest bill  in the  House all 
extended the existing support mechanisms, albeit with different levels of budget savings.  The 
three  proposals  also  had  similar  provisions  for  sugar  and  peanuts,  essentially  precluding 
substantial price reforms. 
The Emerson-Combest bill  raised the possibility that the House agriculture committee 
would not vote to endorse Roberts' Freedom to Farm Act.  In response, Roberts emphasized that 
the House Republican leadership was unwilling to reauthorize farm  support programs without 
significant reforms--particularly a cap on future payments and deregulation of production.  On 
September  1  7,  three  days  before  the  House  agriculture  committee's  markup  of  budget 
reconciliation  legislation,  the  chairman  played  his  leadership  card  publicly.  In  a  wide1y-
circulated letter, Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX), and 
Majority  Whip  Tom  DeLay  (R-TX)  wrote  that  unless  the  agriculture  committee  reported 
sweeping reforms they might be compelled to intervene on the budget reconciliation provisions. 
The threat by the three party leaders to impose agricultural policy reform through their control of 
the budget process rested on a little-used provision of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 
The  provision  stipulated  that the  House  rules  committee  could  allow  floor  amendments  to 
achieve changes specified in a budget resolution if any committee failed to submit conforming 
legislation.  In the 20 years prior to the 1995 budget debate, there had been only one instance (in 
1981) in which a House committee had failed to meet its budget reconciliation obligations and 
the leadership had intervened using this rule. 
The House agriculture committee held its markup session on budget reconciliation on 
September 20.  Roberts introduced a bill with four main subtitles to replace his August Freedom 
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editorial. 
The fIrst  subtitle of Roberts'  bill incorporated the Freedom to Fann provisions for the 
feedgrains,  wheat, cotton, and rice.  A total of $38.4 was allocated to contract payments over 
seven fIscal  years (declining from $6.0 billion in 1996 to  $4.4 billion in 2002).  The language 
was  strengthened to  protect "the  interests of operators who  were  tenants  and  sharecroppers." 
Other provisions of  the Freedom to Fann Act were essentially unchanged. 
The second subtitle of  Roberts' bill deregulated the dairy industry.  Marketing orders and 
the dairy support program were eliminated.  Producer assessments were repealed and decoupled 
contractual payments were offered to dairy  fanners  based on historical production levels.  A 
recourse loan program was retained at 90 percent of market prices.  The Dairy Export Incentive 
Program (DEIP) was fully funded at GAIT-maximum levels, a new dairy re-export program was 
authorized,  and  the  secretary  of agriculture  was  empowered  to  assist  the  dairy  industry  to 
establish  an  export  trading  company.  This  subtitle  of Roberts'  bill  was  proposed  by 
Representative Steve Gunderson (R-WI) after he failed to win consensus for a complicated dairy 
program that retained regional marketing orders but provided some inter-regional compensation 
for milk price differentials. 
The third subtitle of  Roberts' bill extended the sugar and peanut programs through 2002. 
Roberts had largely conceded to sugar and peanuts interests and only modest changes to their 
programs were proposed.  The concessions on sugar and peanuts were made to win committee 
approval of the Freedom to Fann Act over the objections of the rice and cotton industries by 
enticing some southern members of the agriculture committee into a coalition with midwestern 
representative (whose constituents would benefIt from the high levels of  support payments while 
world market prices were strong) and policy reformers  (who  applauded the  cap on the fann 
support  entitlement,  the  decoupling  of payments  from  future  production  decisions,  and  the 
elimination  of ARPs).  For  sugar,  the  support  prices  were  maintained  at  the  1995  levels. 
20 Marketing quotas and allotments were repealed and assessments raised to 2 percent of the loan 
rate for cane processors and 2.16 percent of beet processors.  Loans were provided on a recourse 
basis when imports were below the average of three previous years but reverted to nonrecourse 
loans at higher levels of imports.  For peanuts, the support price was lowered from $673 to $610 
beginning  with  the  1996  crop  and  an  automatic  cost-of-production  adjustment  that  pushed 
support levels up was eliminated.  The minimum national production quota was also eliminated, 
some restrictions were relaxed on the sale or lease of quotas across county lines within a state, 
and a system of  priorities was established for allocating quota reductions. 
The fourth subtitle of Roberts' bill addressed other agricultural program provisions.  The 
CRP  was  reauthorized  up  to  36.4  million  acres.  Rental  rates  on  extended  contracts  were 
restricted to  75  percent of the previous level.  Expenditures for export subsidies were reduced 
below the GAIT limits for the years  1996-2000, achieving budget savings of $2.9 billion, but 
retained at GATT-maximums for 2001  and 2002.  The crop insurance program was converted to 
a voluntary basis, with the condition that nonparticipating farmers  agreed in  writing to  waive 
eligibility for emergency crop loss assistance, and the national commission on the future role of 
government in agriculture was established. 
The morning of the House agriCUlture committee markup session was devoted to debate 
on a Democratic alternative to  Roberts'  bill.  The  Democrat's alternative maintained existing 
support  programs  for  the  feedgrains,  wheat,  cotton,  and  rice,  with  budget  savings  achieved 
primarily by raising nonpayment acres to 21  percent.  Representative Charles Stenholm (D-TX), 
a standard setter among the Democrats on the committee, defended supply management as a tool 
of farm policy.  Other Democrats hammered at Roberts for what they claimed was a lack of 
public  hearings  on his  Freedom to  Farm proposal.  They  criticized  the  proposed decoupled 
payments for  destroying the "safety net" that traditional  farm  programs had provided against 
market price instability, and for establishing indefensible ''welfare'' payments for farmers.  But 
21 the Democrat's substitute bill achieved less than one-third of  the agriculture committee's budget-
reduction target, and was doomed to defeat on a party-line vote. 
The  discussion  became  more  serious  when  it turned  to  the  Emerson-Combest  bill. 
Representative  Emerson,  the  vice-chairman of the committee, introduced this  substitute.  He 
asserted that it was fiscally  responsible, gave farmers  desired flexibility,  and avoided sending 
"shock waves" through agriculture by decoupling payments from market prices and production. 
The Emerson substitute met the committee's budget obligations and could be used to thwart 
Roberts' proposals. 
Despite his opposition to the extent of  the budget cuts, Stenholm indicated that he would 
vote for the Emerson bill.  The substitute was, he said, "a better way (than Roberts) to proceed." 
Although the  debate  raged  over supply  management  and  deficiency  payments  versus 
planting  flexibility  and  decoupled  payments,  the  fate  of the  Emerson  substitute  rested  on 
Roberts'  generous  provisions  for  sugar  and  the  inclusion  by  Emerson  of dairy  provisions 
opposed  by  midwestern  producers.  Representative  Gunderson  explained  that  by  lowering 
support  prices  for  manufactured  milk  (on  which  midwestern  producers  were  relatively 
dependent)  without  any  inter-regional  compensation,  the  Emerson  substitute  included  a 
"declaration of  war" that had caused the collapse of his earlier attempts to build a regional dairy 
consensus. Representative Collin Peterson (D-MN), who had worked closely with Gunderson on 
behalf of midwestern dairy interests, indicated he would oppose Emerson because of the dairy 
provisions. 
When the vote on the Emerson substitute was taken late in the afternoon, three southern 
Republicans (Richard Baker (LA),  Ed Bryant (IN), and Saxby Chambliss (GA»  voted with 
Emerson  and  Combest.  Had  only  Peterson  defected  from  the  Democrat's  support  for  the 
Emerson substitute, it would have replaced Roberts' bill as the budget reconciliation legislation 
under committee consideration.  But Peterson was joined in voting against Emerson by three 
other Democrats--Tim Johnson (SD), David Minge (MN), and Earl Pomeroy (ND).  These three 
22 Democrats attributed their opposition to the deep budget cuts proposed by  Emerson.  Off the 
record, the influence of directed lobbying by sugar beet and dairy interests in their districts was 
acknowledged. 
With the Emerson substitute defeated, the agriculture committee turned to the Roberts 
bill.  Although he had predicted victory during a dinner break, Roberts was impatient when the 
committee reconvened. 
The vote was called on Roberts' bill late in the evening.  Emerson and Combest opposed 
Roberts,  as  expected.  Representatives  Baker and  Chambliss  again broke  party ranks  to join 
them, so Roberts did not have the support he needed.  The Democrats--Iamenting (in Stenholm's 
words) that the committee use to work together but now was forced to have "policy written by 
Mr. Gingrich or none at all"--voted en masse against Roberts.  Facing defeat, he banged down 
the chairman's gavel and announced suspension of the markup session until ten o'clock.  A few 
moments  later Roberts  banged  the  gavel  again,  his  voice  boomed  out,  "I mean ten  0'  clock 
tonight," and he pulled his party into caucus.  Forty-five minutes later he returned and announced 
tersely that the members had not been able to resolve their differences. 
Lugar's Senate Compromise 
With the House markup session dissolved in deadlock, the process again took a different 
turn in the  Senate.  An agriculture  committee markup that Lugar had initially  scheduled  for 
September 19th was postponed because he did not have unanimous Republican support for a bill 
that included a Freedom to  Farm program for feedgrains  and wheat together with traditional 
support programs for cotton and rice.  Rumors that a further Republican compromise was being 
crafted proved accurate and early the next week Lugar again called his committee into session. 
The revised markup bill Lugar offered included numerous concessions to supporters of 
traditional  farm  programs.  Deficiency  payments  and  individual  crop  acreage  bases  were 
retained,  with  nonpayment  acres  increased  to  30  percent  to  achieve  budget  savings.  The 
authority  for  annual  set-asides  was  eliminated.  Since  this  raised  projected  budget  costs, 
23 maximum caps were set on per-unit deficiency payments to help insure that the required budget 
targets were achieved.  The caps were set on an annual basis at the payment levels projected for 
each year from  1996 to  2002  in  the  February  1995  CBO  budget baseline.  Loan rates  were 
retained at  85  percent of the  Olympic moving  average of past prices,  the  existing minimum 
nominal loan rate levels were retained for cotton and rice, and the marketing loan authority was 
extended.  F  eedgrain  and  wheat  producers  gained  increased  planting  flexibility,  with  more 
restrictive provisions for cotton and rice.  For sugar and peanuts, the revised markup bill included 
language along the lines of Cochrane.  The Lugar bill also included a cap on CRP expenditures 
and a  dairy proposal  that maintained  milk  marketing  orders  and regional  price  differentials. 
Price supports on milk powder and butter were eliminated to allow these products to enter world 
markets without subsidies, but the support price mechanism for cheese was maintained. 
The  Senate  agriculture  committee  met  to  consider  the  Lugar  bill  on  September  27. 
Opposition to the sugar and peanut provisions by Senator Santorum (R-PA) delayed its approval, 
but modest changes led to his acquiescence and the committee approved a revised bill the next 
day.  The defenders of traditional farm price support mechanisms now had the advantage of a 
legislative proposal that had been approved by an authorizing committee.  Within the constraint 
of  the budget resolution, it gave them much of  what they sought. 
The House Budget Reconciliation Bill 
In the House of Representatives, renewed maneuvering to  see  whether the  agriculture 
committee  could  pass  legislation  for  inclusion  in  the  budget  reconciliation  bill  began  after 
Roberts' defeat.  The four Republican defectors defended their position.  They argued that the 
traditional farm programs tied to market prices were working well and, like many Democrats, 
questioned  the  wisdom  of decoupled  Freedom  to  Farm  payments  as  welfare  for  farmers. 
Representatives  Emerson  and  Combest  sought  a  hearing  with  the  Republican  leadership. 
Reform-minded members of  the agriculture committee also mobilized.  Freshman members, led 
by John Hostettler (R-IN), circulated a letter to the Speaker imploring him to "present the task of 
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being "watered down to appease certain commodity groups opposed to reform." 
Throughout  the  following  week,  the  issue  remained  whether  Roberts  and  the  House 
leadership would try to force consent to the chairman's bill by the dissenting Republicans or seek 
a compromise with them.  Internal negotiations broke into public view when a staff memo from 
the office of Majority Whip DeLay slipped into circulation.  The memo described a September 
22 meeting at which the leadership gave Roberts "carte blanche to do what he needs to do."  The 
memo also suggested that a compromise was taking shape on farm policy across the Capitol and 
that there would be nothing to gain from being too hard on the House "Aggies" because "you 
will get no real reform through the Senate." 
After  a  week  of maneuvering  and  negotiations,  the  Republicans  on  the  agriculture 
committee had not reached a resolution of  their differences.  On September 27, while the Senate 
committee  was  recessed,  Roberts  announced  that  his  committee  would  abrogate  its 
responsibility.  This passed the responsibility about farm policy for the budget reconciliation bill 
to the leadership of  the House of  Representatives. 
Immediately  following  his  decision,  Roberts  insisted  he  would  win  inclusion  of his 
proposals  with House  leadership  backing.  It became  apparent,  however,  that the  leadership 
would not discipline the dissidents from the agriculture committee.  Emerson and Combest were 
assured there would be no  reprisals for their votes.  On September 29, Emerson and Combest 
made their case to House Speaker Gingrich.  The Republican conference chairman Boehner, a 
cosponsor of the Roberts bill, acknowledged that a compromise might be necessary in light of 
the  "fragile" Republican majority  in the  House and  eventual need to  "deal with the  Senate" 
(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 9/30). 
The Republican's budget reconciliation legislative process was far behind schedule in late 
September.  With the 1996 fiscal year about to begin, the leadership was increasingly at risk from 
the accusation that they had lost control of  the agenda of  the Congress.  Floor votes on the budget 
25 reconciliation bill were scheduled for  October 26-27.  Important missing pieces of the budget 
package  fell  into  place  as  House  and  Senate  committees  passed  proposals  on  Medicaid, 
Medicare,  and  taxes.  Meanwhile,  behind  the  scenes  maneuvering  continued  on  the  House 
agriculture provisions. 
Representative  Gunderson's  characterization  of the  dairy  policies  included  in  the 
Emerson bill as a declaration of  war proved right, just as his own proposal for deregulation split 
regional interests.  Senator Jim Jeffords (R-VT), representing the northeastern dairy  industry, 
requested an evaluation of  whether eliminating milk marketing orders as proposed by Gunderson 
would  violate  the  Senate's  Byrd  rule,  which  excludes  extraneous  measures  lacking  budget 
implications from the reconciliation process.  The Senate parliamentarian ruled that elimination 
of  marketing orders would be a violation, and Jeffords announced he would invoke the Byrd rule 
were the Gunderson proposal brought to  the  Senate.  Jeffords' threat essentially precluded the 
prospect of  deregulating the domestic milk market through budget reconciliation, since a 60 vote 
majority would be required to overcome a rules objection. 
House opponents of deregulation of the dairy industry were also vocal.  A group of 30 
dairy-state members pressed for legislation along the lines of  the Emerson-Combest bill.  Within 
the House leadership, support for retaining the milk marketing orders came from the chairman of 
the rules committee, Gerald Solomon (R-NY), who represented an upstate dairy district.  Yet, 
just weeks before taking on the dairy cause, Solomon had espoused the view that the "historical" 
changes the Republicans were attempting to bring about required that the leadership "pick up the 
slack" from committees that fell "behind the revolutionary curve" (Washington Post, 10/09). 
As the House moved toward its scheduled vote on the budget reconciliation bill, it was 
inevitable that the leadership would make concessions to obtain the votes needed to insure it 
passed.  The internal dissension persisted for  agriculture and, as Roberts dryly  observed, the 
leadership was afforded '1he joy of  listening to every commodity group."  Emerson and Combest 
rallied  14  rural  southern  representatives  to  indicate  they  would  have  trouble  supporting 
26 reconciliation if it  contained the  Freedom  to  Farm  Act.  They  were joined by  opponents  to 
Gunderson's  dairy  deregulation.  Facing  this  persistent  opposition  in  agriculture,  Gingrich 
acknowledged  that  he  lacked  the  votes  he  needed  for  reconciliation.  Representative  David 
Hobson (R-OH), a member of  the Republican leadership group, told the press that "the big thing" 
was getting the farm issues resolved (Washington Post, 10/25). 
The afternoon before the floor vote, Gingrich met with the farm-district representatives. 
Bending to party unity, the dissenters acquiesced to the Speaker's request to set aside parochial 
issues.  Roberts' Freedom to Farm Act and the other subtitles of his markup proposal would be 
incorporated in the House budget reconciliation bill.  In return, the dairy, cotton and rice interests 
opposed to  the  Roberts  bill  were  assured  that their concerns  would  be  addressed  during  the 
House-Senate budget conference. 
The  House  of Representatives  passed  the  budget  reconciliation  bill  on  October  26--
essentially on a disciplined party-line vote.  The  14  rural  southern Republicans  organized by 
Emerson  and  the  30  Republicans  opposed  to  deregulation  of the  dairy  industry  joined  the 
majority of 227-203.  Emerson insisted that no final deal had been brokered but many observers 
concluded that Roberts had agreed that the House would largely recede to the Senate on farm 
policy in the budget conference committee.  A few others insisted that Roberts remained serious 
about moving  Freedom to  Farm.  Roberts'  staff claimed  he  was  committed to  the  contract 
payments but would compromise in other areas. 
The Democrat's Options 
As  the  Republicans  labored  feverishly  to  conclude  the  budget reconciliation process, 
congressional Democrats kept up their attacks on the size of the proposed agricultural budget 
cuts and the proposed change in policy toward decoupled payments.  In late October, the four 
Democratic congressmen who had provided the crucial votes to defeat the Emerson substitute in 
the agriculture committee introduced a bill similar to the Senate Democrat's Farm Security Act. 
Their "Family Empowerment Act"  proposed raising loan rates to  115  percent of the five-year 
27 moving average of past prices,  while  achieving  an  expected  budget  savings  of $4.4  billion. 
Again criticizing the Freedom to Farm Act as doling out "welfare payments for seven years" then 
leaving  farmers  "without  any  safety  net,"  Representative  Peterson  argued  that  "After  the 
president vetoes the budget--which he's going to do-we'll be players at the table." 
While details of  a Clinton administration negotiating position on agriculture could not be 
hammered  out  until  the  reconciliation  bill  was  completed,  three  broad  options  could  be 
identified.  If  the Senate provisions for the deficiency-payment commodities (feedgrains, wheat, 
cotton, rice) prevailed in conference, then the administration could pursue its argument that the 
budget cuts  were  "too deep"  and try to  negotiate  for  fewer  nonpayment acres.  Pushing for 
continuation of existing deficiency payment support mechanisms would prove less effective if 
the conference agreed to the Freedom to Farm Act.  The Democrats could still argue rhetorically 
that the budget cuts were too deep.  But they would be caught on the horns of  a dilemma created 
by Roberts' skillful exploitation of  the budget process.  The administration's own analysis would 
show that with high market prices spending on farm programs would be as much as $8 billion 
less  under  its  proposals  than  under  the  Freedom  to  Farm  provisions  of the  congressional 
reconciliation  bill.  While  the  administration could  attack  the  Republicans  for  "smoke  and 
mirrors" in the budget process, a claim that the Republican's budget cuts were too deep would 
hardly provide a plausible argument for substituting continuation of  the existing programs. 
A second strategy for the administration was to pursue the program structure of higher 
loan rates  as  proposed by  Senate  Democrats.  The  argument  would  be  that the  Republican 
policies weakened (the  Senate bill) or devastated (the House bill) the  safety  net for  farmers 
against falling  prices.  But many Democrats opposed the recoupling of support payments to 
production through higher loan rates.  Use of marketing loans that could be repaid at prevailing 
price levels might avoid the problem of stock accumulation by the government that had arisen 
from  loan  rates  that  were  too  high  in the  past,  but  it  would  not  avoid  potentially  large 
expenditures or the distortionary effects  on production  in years when loan rates were  above 
28 market prices.  High loan rates might be subject to challenges either under the Uruguay Round 
GAIT agreement, which imposed a cap on the  aggregate measure of support for  open-ended 
payments linked to production, or in bilateral anti-dumping petitions.  Moreover, whatever the 
outcome of  the budget reconciliation conference, it was evident that the Republicans would not 
accept substitution of  a loan-rate based policy for their recommended program structure. 
A third strategy for the administration was to  seek increased funding  for conservation 
programs or other priorities that it might argue were under funded in the Republican proposals. 
If the Republicans  put forward  the  Senate  bill,  this would  mean arguing  for  greater cuts  in 
commodity  spending  or  for  allocating  any  additional  funds  made  available  in  the  budget 
negotiations to the Democrat's priorities.  If the Republicans put forward the Freedom to Farm 
Act, the administration might argue that some of the windfall that Roberts had directed toward 
payments to farmers should be redirected toward other goals.  The problem with this strategy for 
the Democrats was that they would abandon their assertion that the Republican proposals cut too 
deeply into farm support programs. 
The Conference Budget Reconciliation Bill 
The  significantly  different  agricultural  provisions  m  the  House  and  Senate  budget 
reconciliation bills left room for wide-ranging negotiations in early November.  One option for 
the commodity programs was to revive a proposal floated earlier by Lugar to provide planting 
flexibility  and  decoupled  contractual  payments  for  feedgrains  and  wheat,  while  retaining 
traditional  deficiency  payments  linked  to  production  and  prices  for  cotton  and  rice.  An 
alternative of  choice between the two programs for individual farmers had also been considered 
and could be resurrected. 
As the House-Senate budget reconciliation conference convened, recognition of  the short-
run windfall  farmers  would  receive  under  the  Freedom  to  Farm  Act came  to  increasingly 
dominate the discussion of the alternatives for  the commodity programs.  Market prices had 
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Figure 1. Rising Prices for Corn and Wheat, August 1994-Aprll 1996. 
(FAPRI) concluded that commodity program payments to farmers would be $5.6 billion greater in 
1996  and  $2.0 billion  greater in  1997  under the  House bill  than  under  the  Senate bill,  while 
payments were projected to be similar in outlying years (FAPRI Policy Working Paper  15-95, 
10/26).  This windfall from decoupled payments was exactly  the "investment" in agriculture  that 
Roberts  had  argued  the  Freedom  to Farm  Act  would  secure.  In the  budget  reconciliation 
conference, his  staff made the case that only the fixed  contractual Freedom to Farm payments 
would ensure that the expenditures projected in the February 1995 CBO baseline were captured 
by agricultural programs.  One by  one,  the various alternative support-payment schemes were 
rejected by the negotiators as infeasible. The conferees were also assured that the CBO would not 
automatically eliminate expenditures for decoupled payments from  its  baselines  for  years  after 
30 Table 2. Conference Budget Reconciliation Bill (Summary of  Agricultural Provisions) 
Support Payments:  Permanent Law Annulled; ARP Authority Terminated 
Deficiency Payments Eliminated 
Fixed Contractual Payments Provided for Seven Years 
Full Projected Expenditures Captured from February 1995 CBO Baseline 
Annual Payments Decline to $4 Billion in 2002 
Planting Flexibility:  Any "Program" or Approved Crop Can Be Planted on Base Acreage 
"Program" Crops Can Be Planted on Additional Acreage 
FruitsN  egetables and Unrestricted Grazing Allowed on 15 Percent of 
Contract Base Acreage 
Loan Rates:  Current "85-Percent" Formula and Marketing Loans Retained 
Minimum Cotton and Rice Loan Rates 
Maximum Loan Rates Established (Wheat: $2.96; Com: $1.94; Cotton: 
0.52; Rice: $6.50) 
Sugar, Peanuts, and Dairy:  Cane Sugar Loan Rate Retained at $O.l81lb With $0.01 Forfeiture Penalty 
When Sugar Imports Exceed 1.5 Million Tons 
Sugar Marketing Allotments Eliminated and Marketing Assessments Raised 
Peanut Support Price Reduced from $678 to $610 
Peanut Cost-of-Production Price Support Adjustments and Minimum 
National Quota Eliminated 
Waiver on Dairy Policy 
CRP, EEP, Other:  CRP Capped at 36.4 Million Acres  With Re-Enrollment and Early-out 
Provisions 
EEP Expenditures Cut, but Rise to GATT-Maximum in 2001 
2002, even though the budget reconciliation legislation would expire.  Agricultural provisions of 
the final  congressional conference budget reconciliation bill are summarized in Table 2.  The 
final  bill  eliminated  authority  for  mandatory  and  voluntary  annual  acreage  set-asides  and 
repealed the Agricultural Act of 1949 as the "permanent" legislation for farm programs.  Cotton 
and  rice  accepted  decoupled  contractual  payments  "established  at  levels  derived  from  the 
February 1995 CBO budget baseline."  Aggregate annual contract payments for all crops would 
total $5.5 billion in 1996 and $5.8 billion in 1997, then decline to $4 billion by 2002. 
31 In the conference negotiations,  planting  flexibility  equivalent to that provided for  the 
feedgrains and wheat was also provided for cotton and rice.  Flexibility was increased for  all 
support-program crops by allowing production of fruits and vegetables and unrestricted grazing 
and  haying  on  15  percent  of contract  base  acreage.  The  payment-limitation refonn  in  the 
Freedom to Fann Act was eliminated by retaining the existing "three-entity" rule for payments to 
individuals.  Cotton also retained special  "Step-2 payments"  for  processors, with the existing 
payment trigger and an aggregate spending cap of$701 million over 1996-2002. 
While the conference budget reconciliation bill provided fully decoupled payments and 
more  planting  flexibility  than  had  been  incorporated  in  the  Senate  bill,  cotton  and  rice 
representatives  insisted on retaining  minimum  nominal  loan  rates,  fonnulas  for  detennining 
annual rates at higher levels than proposed in the initial Freedom to Fann Act, and marketing 
loans.  To  accommodate  their  demands,  a  deal  was  struck  in  which  the  loan  rates  were 
maintained at 85  percent of the five-year Olympic moving average of past market prices, with 
minimum nominal rates of  $0.50 per pound for cotton and $6.50 per hundredweight for rice.  To 
limit  the  budgetary  cost  projected  by  the  CBO  for  these  loan  rate  provisions,  caps  on the 
maximum levels of loan rates  were established at their  1995  values.  The  deal  on loan rates 
reduced the pool of money available for contractual Freedom to Fann payments for the benefit 
primarily of  the cotton and rice sectors.  To compensate other producers, the base for calculating 
the percentage of the contractual payments received by each commodity was shifted from  the 
historic payments during 1990-1995 to the projected payments for 1996-2000.  This reduced the 
share going to cotton from 17.8 percent to 11.7 percent. 
Since  the  cotton  and  rice  sectors  moderated  their  earlier  opposition  to  decoupled 
payments and planting flexibility, the congressional conference budget reconciliation bill ended 
up with commodity policies much closer to the Freedom to Fann Act than many observers had 
expected.  Policy for the CRP was also resolved by the conferees along the lines of  the House bill 
The CRP was reauthorized at 36.4 million acres and an option for early termination of contracts 
32 without penalties was included.  The Senate bill had achieved some budget savings by imposing 
nominal spending caps on the CRP.  These caps were dropped in anticipation of a larger CBO 
spending  baseline  for  CRP expenditures  in  1996.  A  new livestock  environment assistance 
program sought by Senator Lugar was retained with funding authorized up to $100 million per 
year. 
The conference negotiations over sugar were more contentious.  Lugar pressed a proposal 
for a tax on Florida sugar producers to pay for restoration of  the everglades.  A second proposal, 
imposing a broader tax on domestic and imported sugar, was floated as an alternative.  Defenders 
of the  sugar  program  eventually  beat  back  these  challenges.  Sugar  support  prices  were 
maintained,  as  in  the  House  and  Senate  bills,  marketing  allotments  were  eliminated,  and 
marketing assessments were raised to the levels specified in the Senate bill (less than proposed 
by the House).  Modest concessions to critics of the sugar program were to keep the level of 
imports triggering nonrecourse loans at 1.5 million metric tons and to retain a $O.Ol/lb forfeiture 
penalty, as Santorum had negotiated in the Senate bill. 
The peanut program was also maintained with only modest reforms in the conference 
budget reconciliation bill.  The support price was reduced to $610 per ton, as in the House bill, 
and the price support cost-of-production adjustment formula and minimum national quota were 
eliminated.  The  peanut  program  was  reauthorized  through  2002,  in  contrast  to  a  limited 
reauthorization through 2000 negotiated in the Senate. 
The most contentious conference negotiations were on dairy policy, which remained tom 
by regional differences.  A deadlock between Gunderson, on behalf of midwestern producers, 
and  Solomon,  on behalf of northeastern  producers,  forced  the  conferees  to  drop  both the 
deregulation proposal from the House bill and the Senate dairy provisions.  This left the budget 
conference without an agreement about how to achieve savings on dairy.  Gunderson threatened 
to  impose  changes in the  dairy  program  in subsequent  legislation,  Roberts  warned that the 
intransigence of the dairy interests would bring "trouble down the road,"  and House Speaker 
33 Gingrich railed that "It is unfair for one part of  agriculture to block refonn in its programs as we 
are pursuing change across the rest."  Nevertheless, the immediate consequence of the impasse 
was that the House and Senate leadership agreed to lower the mandated budget savings from 
agricultural programs from the original $13.4 billion to $12.3 billion, largely because the $800 
million anticipated from dairy refonn had not materialized.  Not only was refonn of  the structure 
of  dairy programs thwarted, but budget discipline was relaxed on behalf of  agriculture. 
Collapse of  the Republican Budget Initiative 
The congressional budget reconciliation bill was approved by the House and Senate on 
November  18.  Failure  of Congress  and  the  administration  even to agree  on a  "continuing 
resolution" to provide temporary funding had already shut down parts of the government for a 
record six days.  A promised presidential veto of  the budget reconciliation bill loomed ahead. 
On November 19, a compromise was reached to  fund  government operations through 
, 
December 15.  The president agreed to enact legislation to balance the budget in seven years 
using scoring by the CBO (which projected larger future deficits than the administration's OMB 
and  therefore  required  more  savings  to  attain  budget  balance).  In exchange  for  this  basic 
commitment,  the  Republicans  agreed  that  the  budget  would provide  "adequate  funding"  for 
programs  in  the  president's  priority  areas  of  "Medicare,  welfare,  Medicaid,  education, 
agriculture, national defense, veterans, and the environment." 
Negotiations over the budget resumed when Congress returned from the Thanksgiving 
break.  What had been agreed upon immediately became contentious.  The Republican leadership 
claimed the president had committed to a balanced budget in seven years and demanded that he 
provide a precise plan around which negotiations could proceed.  On December 7,  President 
Clinton vetoed the  congressional  budget reconciliation bill.  The  administration argued that 
protecting the president's priorities was equally important to the November 19 agreement, and 
called on the Republicans to be forthcoming with concessions on Medicare and other spending. 
34 As  the  administration  and  congressional  leaders  jockeyed  for  position  in  the  budget 
negotiations, both sides also waited for completion of updated CBO budget projections.  When 
the new projections were released, on December  11,  fiscal  deficits were projected to  be  $135 
billion smaller over seven years than had been anticipated when Congress developed its balanced 
budget plans  (using  CBO's February  1995  baseline).  The  revised  CBO  budget  projections 
significantly  narrowed  the  $400  billion  gap  between  what  the  administration  claimed  was 
necessary  to  balance  the  budget,  based  on  OMB  projections,  and  what  the  Republican 
congressional  leadership claimed was  required,  using  CBO.  The  Republicans modified their 
budget plan,  using  this  windfall  to  expand  spending  in the  hope  of striking  a deal  with  the 
president.  But when the continuing resolution expired on December 15, they concluded that the 
Clinton administration had not been forthcoming with a balanced budget proposal.  Arguing that 
the administration had negotiated in bad faith,  the Republicans refused to extend the temporary 
government  spending  authority,  forcing  some  government  agencies  to  shut  down  for  an 
unprecedented second time.  The  administration argued that it was the Republicans who  were 
intransigent, and were using the government shutdown to force  cuts that it would not accept in 
Medicare,  Medicaid, and other spending. 
While the Republican's budget initiative had brought the president closer to endorsing a 
balanced budget than his posture at the beginning of the year,  the  standing of the Republican 
Congress with the public seemed tenuous at the outset of the second disruption of government 
services.  The  second  partial  shutdown  affected  only  a  fraction  of the  civilian  government 
workforce, but some highly visible services were  interrupted.  The confrontation did not play 
well  in  public  opinion.  Heated  exchanges  between  the  two  sides  continued  through  the 
Christmas holidays without substantial progress.  Yielding to the unpopularity of the shutdown, 
which  opinion polls  showed  was  blamed  mostly  on the  Republicans,  agreement for  another 
temporary spending resolution was reached on January 5,  1996.  The Republicans still hoped to 
35 force acceptance of a seven-year balanced budget plan, so the temporary spending measure set 
yet another short-term deadline of January 26. 
With  the  government  back  at  work  and  public  opinion  badly  against  them,  the 
Republicans now found  much of the  momentum gone  from  their year-long  effort to  craft  a 
political agenda around their omnibus budget reconciliation bill.  The president had successfully 
positioning himself as the defender of popular spending programs, while usurping some of the 
Republican's rhetoric.  Declaring in his state of  the union address that ''the era of  big government 
is over," the president outlined an administration budget to achieve fiscal balance in 2002 using 
CBO forecasts.  The next day, the Republicans conceded that they would not be able to force 
their  agenda  on the  administration,  and  announced  they  would  work  with  the  president  on 
mutually acceptable measures to extend authority for government spending and borrowing.  By 
the January 26 deadline, spending resolutions were approved by large bipartisan majorities that 
continued short-term spending through March 15, albeit at restricted levels below those that the 
Democrats  continued to seek. 
The Revised Agricultural Budget 
As had been widely anticipated, the revised December CBO baseline lowered projected 
spending on agriculture under existing programs from $56.6 to  $48.8, contributing almost $8 
billion to  the  $135  billion reduction in the  projected size of the  deficit.  The  farm-program 
savings in the new CBO baseline were derived primarily from higher market price expectations, 
and  hence  lower  expected  deficiency  payments,  during  1996-97.  A  continued  Republican 
commitment to policy redesign  that would  save  $13.4  billion from  agriculture  would  leave 
spending at only $35.4 billion using the revised CBO projections, and would allow the market-
price related savings from agricultural programs to be used for other purposes. 
With the new budget figures, the proposed spending with decoupled Freedom to Farm 
payments now exceeded expected deficiency payments and other expenditures under 1990 law 
by $3.4 billion during the first two years (see Table 3).  This windfall further demonstrated the 
36 Table 3.  Projected CCC Spending, Baseline (1990 Farm. Bill) versus Decoupled Payments 
Fiscal Year  1995 CBO Baseline Projections  Decoupled  Decoupled 
Payments  Payments 
Compared to  Compared to 
February 1995  December 1995 
CBO Baseline  CBO Baseline 
February  December 
1995  1995 
Billion Dollars 
1996  8.6  3.8  -1.3  +2.8 
1997  8.5  5.6  -1.5  +1.1 
1998  8.4  8.1  -1.4  -1.0 
1999  8.2  8.2  -1.5  -1.4 
2000  7.9  7.8  -1.6  -1.5 
2001  7.5  7.7  -2.5  -2.2 
2002  7.5  7.6  -2.4  -2.4 
Seven Years  56.6  48.8  -12.2  -4.6 
Baseline  spending  projected  by  CBO  includes  CCC  spending  for  price  supports  and  related 
programs (primarily the Export Enhancement Program) assuming continuation of 1990 law as 
modified through 1995.  Budget changes with Decoupled Payments include savings in non-CCC 
agricultural programs of  nearly $1.0 billion. 
appeal of  the contracts to Roberts.  He campaigned to insure that agriculture was given credit for 
the market price driven savings in the revised CBO projections.  This would allow him to retain 
the carefully orchestrated spending targets he had negotiated among agricultural interests for the 
budget reconciliation bill,  but would  leave  an estimated  budget  savings of only  $4.5  billion 
compared to the original $13.4 billion.  Roberts received assurances from the House leadership 
that the initial spending would be maintained. 
37 The  Democrats  continued to  criticize the  Republicans  for  making  cuts  in agricultural 
programs  that  were  too  deep,  but  the  new  budget  numbers  also  affected  their  negotiating 
positions.  In early  December, the  administration had released  a farm  bill proposal that still 
calledfor an increase of nonpayment acres to 21  percent to achieve budget savings on deficiency 
payments.
6  The OMB projected farm program expenditures at $42.4 billion during 1996-2002 
under existing law,  and credited the administration's proposals with a savings of $5.0 billion. 
Thus, at this point, it appeared there were not irreconcilable difference in the budget implications 
of the Democratic and Republican farm  policy proposals.  The OMB  projections implied less 
spending under the administration's proposal, while congressional Democrats continued to call 
for  cuts of $4  billion using CBO projections, the  same level of cuts that were now projected 
under Freedom to Farm and the conference budget reconciliation bill. 
There remained substantial policy differences between the Republican and Democratic 
proposals, however.  The administration used the veto of the budget bill on December 7 to press 
various  arguments  against  decoupled  payments.  The  Republican  agricultural  proposal,  the 
president asserted,  "eliminates the  safety net that farm  programs provide for  U.S.  agriculture, 
provides windfall payments to producers when prices are high but does not protect family farm 
income when prices are low, slashes spending for agricultural export assistance, and reduces the 
environmental  benefits of the  Conservation  Reserve  Program."  A  subsequent administration 
budget proposal in mid December included no changes in farm  spending, thus beating its own 
earlier  recommendations  and  the  congressional  budget  reconciliation  bill,  and  allowing  the 
Democrats to resurrect their argument that the Republicans were cutting agricultural spending by 
too much. 
6  Among its other provisions, the administration proposal also  called for  planting  flexibility 
without loss of  program benefits, continuation of  loan rates (without minimum nominal levels for 
cotton and rice), and acreage set-aside authority. 
38 Emergence of  a Bipartisan Coalition 
With new farm  legislation caught up in the collapsing budget negotiations, the  104th 
Congress failed to update the 1990 farm bill before it expired in 1995.  At the end of  the calendar 
year, commodity programs for wheat and feedgrains reverted back to "permanent'"  legislation 
from 1949, which had been continuously suspended under various subsequent farm bills.  Under 
the permanent law, USDA was required to offer loan rates of  from $6.52 to $7.82 for wheat and 
up to $5.30 for com to farmers holding required production allotments. 
The reversion  to  untenable  permanent  law that  was  technically  pending  kept  a  dull 
pressure on the legislative processes for farm policy.  Not only would farmers need to know what 
farm programs would be operational as the spring crop season approached, but proponents of 
farm support legislation could decry the dire consequences of  failure to enact a new law.  Adding 
to  the  agriculturalists  sense  of urgency  was  the  prospect  that  a  fully  updated  CBO  budget 
baseline,  usually  released  in  February  of each  year,  was  likely  to  show even less  spending 
anticipated under the recent (but now expired) farm programs. 
The House Agricultural Market Transition Act 
In anticipation of the possibility that the budget talks would fail, Roberts had introduced 
the main provisions of his  farm  policies  from  the  budget reconciliation bill  as  free-standing 
legislation,  the  Agricultural  Market  Transition  Act,  on  January  5,  1996.  The  increasingly 
lucrative payments under the  Freedom to  Farm contracts,  compared to  deficiency payments, 
together with the numerous concessions that had been made as the original bill worked its way 
through the budget process, had quieted much of  the initial opposition Roberts had faced among 
commodity  groups.  Cotton  producers  and  processors  had  withdrawn  their  once  adamant 
opposition.  Consequently,  Roberts'  bill  was  now  cosponsored  by  the  former  dissident 
Republican agriculture committee members Emerson and Combest.  The American Farm Bureau 
Federation had endorsed Roberts' capped and decoupled farm payments in December--assuming 
they were part of  the Republican budget package that also included capital gains and inheritance 
tax relief and deductibility of health insurance premiums for the self-employed.  The National 
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cited the benefits from increased planting flexibility but objected to the cap on loan rates.  The 
Com Growers called for a policy of  marketing loans as a new permanent law, and for additional 
funding for export and conservation programs.
7 
Opposition to the  Roberts bill,  which continued to be voiced by Democrats,  did not 
crystallize into a cohesive alternative.  Majority Leader Daschle and his supporters remained 
opposed to elimination of  the fann safety net and pressed for higher loan rates.  Daschle insisted 
that Roberts' proposals were a "deal breaker" in the budget talks, a proposition that was never 
tested since the negotiations broke down over so  many other issues.  The administration and 
House Democrats continued to object to the large payments to fanners when market prices were 
high.  The secretary of agriculture raised extension of existing law for one or more years as a 
possible solution.  Alternatively, he and some of  the House Democrats proposed that permanent 
legislation be retained to insure a safety net--at least by putting pressure on Congress to pass new 
fann  legislation  in  the  future.  They  also  proposed  that  some of the  money  designated  for 
contract payments--or, at least, some additional funds--be redirected to purposes such as higher 
loan rates and spending for rural development, research, and conservation. Supporters of these 
programs coalesced around the concept of a "Fund for Rural America" to augment "Freedom to 
Fann." 
When it became apparent by mid January that no budget compromise would be reached 
between the Republicans and the administration, Roberts sought other vehicles to move his fann 
policies forward.  Citing the pressure created by the forthcoming  spring planting season and 
pending reversion to permanent law, he proposed that the commodity provisions from the budget 
7  Among other commodities, rice processors continued to object to the elimination of base 
acreage and planting requirements for specific commodities, fearing that rice production would 
fall  leaving  under-utilized  processing capacity  in some  parts of the  country.  The  National 
Association of Wheat Growers, and the National Farmers Union continued to oppose Roberts, 
citing elimination of  the safety net for farmers, and the American Soybean Association opposed 
the decoupling of payments from production without compensation from higher loan rates to 
protect soybeans producers. 
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operational through March 15.  This was rejected by Daschle, who essentially held veto power 
once the Republicans conceded that they wanted to avoid a third government shutdown.  Roberts 
then seemed poised to wait until after a congressional recess during February to try to move his 
bill forward.  But when the Senate scheduled a farm bill debate for just before the break, Roberts 
reversed himself and called the House agriculture committee back into session. 
Roberts' committee met on January 30.  Between the budget conference and late January, 
negotiations had continued among regional dairy interests.  A compromise agreement similar to 
the regulatory package Gunderson had initially tried to negotiate had been agreed upon by many 
of  the dairy representatives.  Under this complicated agreement, a floor would be set under fluid 
milk  prices,  higher  standards  for  nonfat  milk  solids  used  in  California  would  be  imposed 
nationally,  and  support  prices  would  be  retained  for  cheese  but  withdrawn  from  butter  and 
powdered  milk.  Marketing-order  price  differentials  would  be  maintained,  but  part  of the 
differential  revenue  would  be  pooled  among  the  regions  over  a  two-year  transition  period. 
Revenue for processed products would also be pooled, with each farmer receiving an average of 
the  returns.  Within two  years,  the  secretary  of agriculture  would  be  required to  amend the 
marketing  orders,  reducing  the  number  from  34  to  no  more  than  13.  Failure  to  revise  the 
marketing order system would  trigger  a cessation of all  federal  dairy  programs.  Gunderson 
argued this agreement would lead to deregulation of  the dairy industry, but acknowledged that its 
many compromise provisions were also designed to raise the total revenue of  dairy producers. 
Last minute negotiations had also proceeded in other areas.  Planting flexibility under the 
Freedom to Farm payments was reduced at the behest of  fruit and vegetable producers to prohibit 
production of  these commodities on contract acreage.  Efforts of  grain processors to allow early 
termination  of CRP  contracts  were  turned  back  when  the  congressional  sportsman's  caucus 
voiced opposition.  Roberts reintroduced his commission on the future of agricultural policy but 
also adopted the budget conference agreement to nullify the  1949 permanent law.  With these 
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Republican committee majority, insuring that he would not fail to pass a bill for a second time. 
In the negotiations proceeding the agriculture committee meeting, Roberts had also hoped 
to broaden his base of support to  include a block of Democrats.  To  gain their allegiance, he 
sought to make as much as $2.5 billion dollars available for the Fund for Rural America.  The 
possibility of including these additional funds had originated in compromise discussions around 
an overall budget package.  As late as the night before the agriculture committee meeting, the 
Democrats thought the funds could be incorporated in Roberts' farm  bill, for which he would 
then still be able to claim budget savings relative to the December 1995 CBO baseline of about 
$2 billion. 
Roberts'  conciliatory efforts were thwarted in the end when the Republican leadership 
would not endorse funding  for  the  Democrat's priorities outside of the framework of a broad 
budget compromise.  This  forced  Roberts  to  withdraw his  tentative  offer and  led  to  another 
acrimonious  and  partisan committee debate.  In  a letter to  Roberts,  Secretary of Agriculture 
Glickman reiterated the administration's many  objections to  his  bill.  The  Democrats  decried 
their  exclusion  from  the  process  and  the  intransigence  of the  Republican  leadership.  They 
offered numerous amendments, including a substitute bill that forgave  repayment of advanced 
deficiency payments for farmers suffering crop losses in 1995 but reduced the Freedom to Farm 
contract  payments  in  half,  redirecting  the  savings  to  higher  loan  rates  and  other  spending 
programs.  Another Democratic amendment would have committed $3.5 billion of  CCC funds to 
rural water and sewage projects.  These and other Democratic alternatives were defeated, and 
Roberts'  Agricultural  Market  Transition  Act  was  approved  by  the  committee.  Assured  of 
passing, his bill now received three Democratic votes. 
Following the committee victory, Roberts  sought to  bring his bill to  the House  floor 
before the February recess.  He argued that the proximity of  the pending planting season created 
an emergency situation requiring that the farm bill be considered under a "closed rule" limiting 
debate and precluding floor amendments.  The House rules committee scheduled a hearing to 
42 determine the conditions of the floor debate, but the acrimonious atmosphere of the committee 
session cost Roberts the cooperation he needed from the Democrats.  They refused to waive their 
right to a three-day grace period for filing the minority's views.  This pushed the earliest possible 
date for consideration of  the farm bill by the House onto a weekend it was scheduled to adjourn. 
Roberts'  farm  bill  also  faced  pockets  of strong  opposition  within  his  own  party. 
Representative  Dan Miller circulated a  letter among the  Republicans  reminding  them of the 
promise  that  critics  of the  sugar  and  peanut  programs  would  have  an opportunity  to  offer 
amendments.  His letter indicated that he expected Roberts to live up to this commitment. 
The dairy provisions of Roberts'  bill also remained contentious.  The chairman of the 
rules  committee  and  other Republicans  protecting  upstate  New York  interests  opposed  the 
Gunderson compromise, with its pooling of fluid-milk price differentials.  The dairy provisions 
also  drew strong opposition from  dairy processors and consumer groups, who objected to the 
higher prices they argued would result.  The dairy processors gained the attention of CBS news, 
where  Dan Rather warned after the agriculture committee vote that he  had been alerted by a 
"major Republican financial contributor" to a "secret deal" that would raise milk prices. 
In light of the bipartisan dissension and negative media publicity, Roberts was forced to 
abandon his request for prompt consideration of  the farm bill.  The House adjourned through late 
February without a floor debate. 
The Senate Agricultural Reform and Improvement Act 
The  farm  policy  situation in the  Senate  was  much  more  fluid  than  in the  House  of 
Representatives.  In late January, Senator Lugar introduced the Freedom to Farm bill, essentially 
as it had been included in the budget act.  Lugar, who was engaged in a longshot campaign for 
the Republican presidential nomination,  was eager for  the  Senate to approve some farm  bill 
before  the  Iowa Republican  caucuses  in  early  February--a  view  shared  by  Senate  Majority 
Leader Robert  Dole  (R-KS),  the  primary  campaign  front  runner.  At the  opposite  extreme, 
Daschle was potentially going to filibuster against legislation incorporating any form of  Freedom 
to Farm contracts.  To move a bill through the Senate, Lugar and Dole seemed willing to accept a 
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redirecting part of  the contract payments were under consideration. 
The Senate debate on the farm bill began on Thursday, January 30.  A motion for cloture 
on the Lugar bill failed 53-45 the following day. 
In anticipation of  this defeat, Lugar had also cosponsored a bipartisan substitute bill with 
Senator Patrick Leahy  (D-VT),  who  had  been willing to break ranks  with other Democratic 
leaders.  The Lugar-Leahy bill retained the Freedom to Farm payments provisions, but broadened 
the scope of the legislation to include conservation titles and reauthorization of the food stamp 
and  other  nutrition  programs.  At  Leahy's  insistence,  it  also  included  a  "Northeast  Dairy 
Compact," a controversial authority to raise regional milk prices above the level authorized by 
the existing federal marketing order.  An increase in the contract payments to rice producers of 
over $200 million had been added to secure the support of  Louisiana's Democratic Senators. 
After the Lugar bill failed to  win cloture, a vote  on the Lugar-Leahy bill was delayed 
while Democrats drafted a "Freedom to Farm" alternative that Daschle might support.  Splitting 
the contract payments was proposed, with 40 percent guaranteed to farmers and the remaining 60 
percent retained for payments coupled to market prices and other uses.  Willingness of  Lugar and 
Dole to accept such an alternative scheme may have been based on the calculation that any such 
provisions  would  eventually  be  dropped  in  a  conference  with  the  House,  since  similar 
alternatives  had  been  floated  and  abandoned  earlier  during  negotiations  of  the  budget 
reconciliation  conference  committee.  In  any  case,  immediate  bipartisan  agreement  was 
postponed over a weekend recess. 
Postponing the vote on a scheme of split-payments led to its demise when 14  Senate 
Republicans  signaled  their objections  to  scaling  back the  direct  payments  to  farmers.  The 
. following week, the Senate approved a bill along the lines of  Lugar-Leahy by a nearly veto-proof 
64-32 majority.  To gain this majority, the Republican's accepted retention of  the permanent law, 
which Daschle and other Democrats claimed as a key victory for maintaining a safety net for 
farmers.  Additional concessions to insure passage of the Senate bill included higher loan rates 
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was authorized for preservation of the Everglades, without a tax on Florida sugar producers. 
Research, trade, rural development and credit provisions passed earlier in the year by the Senate 
agriculture committee were also incorporated in the Senate bill, but the Northeast Dairy Compact 
was deleted on a floor amendment. 
The House Agricultural Regulatory Relief  and Trade Act 
The  Lugar-Leahy  alliance  preserved  the  Freedom  to  Farm  proposal  for  commodity 
payments but also dramatically expanded the scope of the farm  bill, turning it from  Roberts' 
narrow commodity program focus toward a more traditional comprehensive coverage of farm, 
conservation and nutrition programs.  This opened several potentially divisive fissures among 
Republicans.  Roberts' staff estimated that the Senate bill would cost $5.4 billion more than the 
House bill, thus exceeding the projected expenditures in the December CBO budget baseline. 
This level of  expenditure was likely to be opposed by budget-disciplinarians in the House. 
Of the additional spending in the Senate bill, almost $4 billion was attributed to various 
conservation and environmental initiatives.  The added funding  for these programs and, more 
importantly, an explicit emphasis on using the CRP to protect water quality, brought regional 
disputes to a head (specifically by shifting future  CRP eligibility from the wheat regions that 
included  Roberts'  Kansas  district to  the  more  heavily  populated midwestern states).  It also 
exacerbated a simmering difference between Republicans who were proponents of an expanded 
government role  in conservation and those calling  for  fewer  mandates  and  less  government 
intervention.  The environmental deregulators had prevailed in the House through adoption of  the 
Contract with America in the spring of 1995.  But their momentum had withered under the crush 
of the budget debate.  By February 1996, the perception was that the public was wary of the 
Republican's commitment to maintaining environmental quality. 
Conflicting Republican positions on reform of  the nutrition programs were also brought 
into the farm bill debate by the Lugar-Leahy bill.  Structural changes in the nutrition programs 
were an integral part of  separate Republican welfare reform proposals.  Welfare reform had once 
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to account for $34 billion of  the proposed savings.  The Republicans were still engaged in high-
stakes maneuvering to pass a welfare reform bill on its own and have it signed into law, and 
much of  the proposed budget savings remained under consideration.  To reauthorize the existing 
nutrition programs in the farm bill would be at least a symbolic blow to the Republican's broader 
commitments.  Even though  it  could  be  argued  that  nutrition  program  reforms  and  budget 
savings  would be  addressed in subsequent legislation,  the farm  bill  was  being  trumpeted  as 
having a certain urgency, while the welfare reform bill and efforts to balance the budget were 
bogged down in partisan dispute. 
From the time that the commodity programs became emerged in the budget reconciliation 
process  in  early  1995,  Roberts'  strategy  had  been to  hold  other aspects  of farm  policy  for 
consideration in a second later bill, which came to referred to commonly as "farm bill two".  This 
second farm  bill was  intended to  deliver on many  of the  promises Roberts  had made  in his 
"policy ledger," with its benefits to farmers from lower interest rates, lower taxes, and regulatory 
relief that would offset lower commodity payments under the Republican agenda. 
Given  the  Senate  compromise,  Roberts  was  forced  to  hurry  the  preparation  of his 
remaining  legislation.  He  announced  that  an  Agricultural  Regulatory  Relief and  Trade  Act 
would be introduced in the House in late February.  While continuing to argue for a separate bill, 
Roberts conceded that its rushed introduction would at least strengthen the negotiating position 
of  the House Republicans in dealing with their Senate counterparts. 
When  the  Agricultural  Regulatory  Relief  and  Trade  Act  was  introduced,  Roberts 
emphasized that it "fulfilled a promise we made ... to reduce the government's involvement in 
farmer's lives."  Among its provisions, the bill provided farmers with greater flexibility to choose 
conservation compliance practices, exempted wetlands of  less than one acre from regulation, and 
extended authority for the CRP without modifications to the enrollment criteria.  Paralleling the 
coverage  of the  Senate  legislation,  the  bill  included  reform  of federal  agricultural  lending 
programs, block-grants of rural development funds to the states, reauthorization of international 
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embargoes,  extension  of research  and  extension  programs,  and  other  provisions.  He  again 
proposed that this legislation remain separate from the commodity bill he was about to take to 
the floor,  and claimed to have been assured by the Speaker of the House that time would be 
available for floor debate on the second farm bill during the spring.  Reauthorization of food 
stamps and other nutrition programs was not included in Roberts' second bill. 
The Amended  Agricultural Market Transition Act 
Over the February break., Roberts also engaged in negotiations over the rules under which 
the Agricultural Market Transition Act would be debated on the House floor.  He failed to obtain 
the closed rule he had sought.  Instead, the leadership decided that a limited number of floor 
amendments would be considered. 
When the House rules committee met on February 27,  Democrats pressed their usual 
complaint that the farm bill had been designed without the benefit of sufficient public hearings. 
They argued for an open rule allowing unlimited floor amendments.  Roberts acknowledged that 
he would not be granted the closed rule he had sought at the end of January, but argued for a 
"modified" closed rule which would limit amendments and the length of  the debate.  He argued 
again that the restricted process  was  warranted  by the  "time  sensitivity"  of the  farm  policy 
situation.  Rules committee chairman Solomon acknowledged the need to move the legislation 
forward  expeditiously but reiterated that controversial issues would be addressed by allowing 
some amendments. 
Of 75  amendments for which time was requested,  16 were ruled in order.  The limited 
amendments  allowed  a  single  alternative  to  the  entire  bill,  one  challenge  to  each  of the 
controversial  commodity  programs  (cotton,  peanuts,  sugar,  dairy),  and  challenges  to  the 
mandatory  funding  the  bill  provided  for  conservation  and  other purposes.  It also  allowed 
amendments to increase the mandatory expenditures for conservation, to reauthorize international 
food aid programs, and a block Democratic amendment that added rural development funding, 
higher soybean loan rates, and retention of  permanent law. 
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potential to wreck support for the bill among House agriculturalists by disrupting the carefully 
constructed balance of gains among commodities negotiated in the committee legislation.  The 
conservation, food aid,  and Democratic modifications blurred the distinction between Roberts' 
two bills and would bring the House legislation closer to the Senate bill.  Since the House bill did 
not address nutrition programs, and amendments to do so would have been ruled out of  order, an 
obvious gap was left between the bills that would emerge from the two sides of  Congress. 
At  the  start  of the  House  floor  debate,  it  was  widely  recognized,  as  Representative 
Stenholm put it,  that the argument over the structure of the commodity support programs had 
been settled.  The supporters of decoupled Freedom to Farm payments, now titled Production 
Flexibility  Contract  (PFC)  payments,  had  won.  A  proforma  amendment  to  end  traditional 
deficiency  payments  by  lowering  target  prices  over  a  five-year  period  was  offered  by  farm 
spending critics, but a recorded roll call vote was not requested when the amendment was ruled 
defeated  on  a  voice  vote.  The  Democrats  continued  to  assail  the  fixed  Freedom  to  Farm 
payments as a palliative windfall in the short run that left no safety net in the long run.  But none 
of  the amendments offering plausible alternatives that had been under discussion (continuation of 
the  1990  law,  splitting  the  decoupled  payments  between  guaranteed  and  price-dependent 
components, or higher marketing loans) were ruled in order.  A last-ditch attempt to reduce the 
contract payments to farmers by shifting almost $2 billion to agricultural research expenditures 
was easily defeated. 
The long-heralded votes on the programs for sugar and peanuts were also somewhat anti-
climatic.  The stage was set when an amendment to  eliminate the costly marketing loans for 
cotton lost by 253-167.  Opponents of  the cotton amendment argued that it was unreasonable to 
impose  particularly  punitive  restrictions  on  a  single  commodity.  The  implication  the 
agriculturalists sought to  convey was that the amendments to phase out the sugar and peanut 
programs suffered from a similar flaw. 
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opposition to the cotton marketing loans.  A coalition of  processing and user industries, market-
oriented reformers, consumer groups, and environmentalists that had been active throughout the 
farm  bill  debate  was  pitted  against  the  entrenched  beneficiaries  of the  sugar  and  peanut 
marketing quotas and price supports.  In both cases, the opponents rallied for a valiant showing 
in  the  final  debate  but  the  producers  had  expressed  confidence  that  they  would  defeat  the 
amendments.  That  confidence  proved  to  be  well-founded,  with  the  Republican  leadership 
apparently working behind the scenes to insure the outcomes (Wall Street Journal, 4/1).  The 
recorded votes showed the peanut amendment failing 209-212 and the sugar amendment defeated 
208-217.  The outcomes were not as close as recorded, since several token votes were shifted in 
favor of  each amendment once it was clear it would not pass.  After the sugar vote, Roberts, who 
had  made  his  accommodation with  the  producers  much  earlier,  turned  and  gave  the  victory 
"thumbs up" to lobbyists who had filled the House gallery. 
The amendment on dairy had a different outcome.  The chairman of  the rules committee, 
who had fought staunchly against any weakening of  the regional milk marketing orders, used his 
power  to  thwart  the  Gunderson  compromise.  Under  the  modified  closed  rules  of debate, 
midwestern opponents of the marketing orders were denied a chance to offer an amendment to 
substitute full deregulation for the Gunderson compromise.  Instead, the only dairy amendment 
allowed  was  provided  by  the  rules  committee  chairman  himself.  Solomon's  amendment 
eliminated the assessments collected from dairy producers, then phased out the support program 
for all manufactured milk products over five years.  The number of marketing orders was to be 
reduced to 10-14 but existing price differentials were not to be modified until the new marketing 
orders were in place.  Solomon argued that his amendment would end government involvement 
in dairy support programs, consistent with the Republican commitment to reduced government 
intervention in the economy (he conveniently ignored intervention through the marketing orders 
and external tariff protection).  Solomon also capitalized on the negative publicity the Gunderson 
compromise  had  received,  claiming  his  bill  would  save  taxpayers  and  consumers  nearly  $4 
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Solomon amendment passed overwhelmingly after  Gunderson,  caught in the contradiction of 
trying  to both raise  producer income  and  achieve  deregulation in his  compromise  proposal, 
agreed with Solomon's cost figures but argued that dairy farmers deserved a "raise" as part of  the 
process leading toward more market orientation. 
The dairy amendment was the only defeat Roberts and the agriculture committee would 
suffer on commodity programs.  They were less successful, however, in maintaining the narrow 
commodity focus of  its bill. 
The conservation provisions of  the House bill were broadened by an amendment offered 
by Representative  Sherwood  Boehlert  (R-NY).  His  amendment  reauthorized  the  CRP  and 
Wetland Reserve Program with provisions for both new enrollments and an early-out option for 
the  least  environmentally  sensitive  land  enrolled  for  five  years  or  more.  The  Boehlert 
amendment also doubled expenditures on conservation cost-sharing programs from $100 million 
to  $200  million  annually,  a  level  of funding  consistent  with  the  Senate  bill.  A  second 
conservation amendment,  offered  by  Representative  Mark  Foley  (R-FL),  added the  Senate's 
$200  million for  restoration of the  Everglades.  International  food  aid  authorities  were  also 
extended by an amendment. 
The  conservation and  food  aid  measures  had political  support among the  Republican 
leadership.  The  leadership's interest was  signaled publicly when Speaker Gingrich made  an 
unusual  floor  speech  in  favor  of Foley's  Everglades  expenditures.  The  chairman  of the 
appropriations  committee,  Robert  Livingston  (R-LA),  had  opposed  the  creation  of new 
mandatory entitlement programs.  Citing aggregate discretionary expenditures as the one place in 
which  the  Republican-dominated  Congress  "had  achieved  its  goal  of lowering  government 
spending," he implored his colleagues not to circumvent the discipline imposed in appropriations 
by authorizing mandatory conservation spending using CCC funds.  Gingrich acknowledged the 
merit of the  budgetary  argument,  but took the  floor  to  reply  that  circumstances dictated an 
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Boehlert amendment 373-37.  The Foley amendment also passed, and food aid was reauthorized. 
The fmal  challenge to the House version of the farm bill was the amendment from the 
Democratic members of  the agriculture committee.  It added $3.5 billion for the Fund for Rural 
America, raised the maximum loan rate for soybeans, and retained the permanent law from 1949. 
These provisions shifted the bill along the lines of the Senate compromise.  Roberts, who had 
supported the Boehlert conservation amendment, turned the budget argument on mandatory rural 
development funding, and opposed permanent law as unworkable.  The Democratic amendment 
was defeated, then the House passed the farm bill with 54 Democratic votes by 270-155.  The 
cost of  the bill had increased by $3.5 billion. 
End Game on the Farm Bill 
Despite remaining differences  in  both scope  and  detail  between the House and Senate 
bills, there was a sense of convergence to the farm policy debate once the House had passed its 
version of the legislation.  It took a few weeks to set the stage for the House-Senate conference 
committee,  but  the  wild  uncertainty  that  had  characterized  the  debate  through  1995  was 
dissipated.  The conference committee met in mid March and proceeded quickly to agreement. 
Barring a presidential veto, there was widespread support for, or at least  acquiescence to, 
the basic restructuring of  the commodity programs into PFC payments.  The veto threat gave the 
administration some bargaining power as the conference committee convened.  The secretary of 
agriculture  continued  to  fault  fixed  payments  decoupled  from  market  prices,  and  Senate 
Democrats  sought an opinion on  whether the  permanent  law gave the  secretary authority to 
extend the  programs  in place  since  1990.  They  received  a  favorable  assessment  (from  the 
Congressional Research Service) but were admonished that renewal of legislation by Congress 
was a more desirable outcome.  Secretary Glickman then acknowledged that the president would 
not veto the farm bill on the basis of  the PFC payments alone, but reiterated the administration's 
concerns for a strengthened safety net and inclusion of  programs for conservation, nutrition, and 
rural development. 
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and Senate Republicans to  forego  using it as an opportunity to  press the rest of their reform 
agenda in favor of their victory  on commodity programs.  The initial posturing around these 
issues was contentious rhetorically, but it appeared that enough Democratic concerns would be 
accommodated  to  ensure  enactment  of the  farm  bill.  Billions  of dollars  of PFC  contract 
payments for a key constituent group were at stake, and the Republicans were badly in need of 
legislative successes a year after their historic 1994 election victory. 
The  House-Senate  compromise  among  Republicans  involved  abandoning  Roberts' 
strategy for a second farm  bill and acceptance of provisions on conservation and nutrition that 
postponed the most controversial Republican attempts at structural reform and budget savings. 
The  conference committee agreed  to  reauthorize  the  CRP  with an early-out option for  some 
acreage, but the radical departure from previous wetlands policy of exempting areas of less than 
one  acre  from  regulation  was  rejected.  A related  deal  was  struck  to  drop  a  western  water 
provision that the administration had indicated was unacceptable in the Senate bill.  Agreement 
was  reached  to  reauthorize  the  food  stamp  program  for  two  years  while  the  welfare  reform 
process proceeded--a compromise which Democrats accepted.  The Fund for Rural America was 
retained  with  $300  million  authorized  over  three  years.  With  these  compromises,  common 
ground was found to ensure bipartisan support for the breadth of  the legislation. 
There  remanded  a  long  list  of details  about  the  commodity  programs  that  could,  m 
principle, derail the fmal agreement.  Last-hour bargaining continued around these details.  One 
issue  involved  planting  flexibility.  On  this  issue,  proponents  of reform  scored  two  small 
victories.  A proposal to allow the secretary of agriculture to require that 50 percent of  historical 
rice acreage of contract recipients  be retained in rice production was defeated.  The planting 
flexibility  allowed  on contract  acreage  was  enhanced  compared  to  the  earlier  bills  when  a 
decision was made to allow haying and grazing on all contract acreage.  Market conditions again 
were key in determining the second outcome.  High crop prices were putting upward pressure on 
52 hay prices, ameliorating some of  the initial opposition by cattlemen to use of  the contract land for 
production of  livestock feed. 
Farm  policy reformers  also  defeated  a last-ditch proposal  by  commodity  groups  (and 
supported by the administration) to remove the caps imposed on loan rates for com and wheat. 
The commodity groups had concluded that CBO was miscalculating the expected savings from 
imposing the loan-rate caps.  They  were  willing to  forgo  almost $500  million of guaranteed 
contract  payments  in  exchange  for  possible  increased  marketing  loan  payments  that  they 
calculated might turn out as much as ten times as valuable. 
The  fmal  issues  that  confronted  the  conference  committee  were  dairy  policy and the 
extension of permanent law.  Leahy had indicated he would insist on inclusion of authority for 
the  Northeast  Dairy  Compact.  Roberts  continued  to  insist  on  nullification  of the  outdated 
permanent law, a concession to reformers in the House of Representatives that had not been in 
his initial bill the previous August.  Opponents of decoupled payments continued to argue that 
extension of  permanent law was essential to provide a safety net for farmers. 
The  conference  committee  recessed  at  1  :OOAM  on  March  21  with  the  final  issues 
unresolved after a marathon IS-hour session.  Roberts offered an extension of  the PFC contracts 
through 2003 or continuation of  the 1949 act through 2004 in lieu of  the permanent law.  Neither 
offer was acceptable to proponents of  retaining the 1949 legislation. 
The committee reconvened later the morning of the 21 st.  Roberts received a short note 
from the secretary of  agriculture stating simply that "we need permanent law."  Shortly after, he 
accepted the  Senate provision to  extend the  1949 act,  while Leahy accepted authority for  the 
secretary to establish the Northeast Dairy Compact if there was "a compelling public interest in 
the region."  The farm bill deal had been struck. 
The conference farm bill was titled the  Federal  Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act (see the appendix for a summary of  the :final act).  It was scored as saving $2 billion 
from the December CBO budget baseline.  The Republican leadership now claimed this savings 
as an indication that they were imposing budget discipline.  The fmal  bill passed in the House 
S3 318-89 and in the Senate 74-26.  It was signed by the president on April 4,  1996.  Even as he 
signed the F  AIR Act, the president promised he would introduce subsequent legislation in 1997 
to improve the safety net for farmers. 
Summary and Conclusions: Whither Farm Policy't 
The recent debate over farm policy has been historic in a number of  dimensions.  For the 
first time in forty years, farm programs were determined by a Republican-dominated Congress. 
An omnibus bill to constrain government spending and balance the federal budget became the 
principle vehicle around which the Republicans organized their overall legislative agenda.  The 
highly-partisan debates in which the political parties inevitably were to engage in this setting 
were played out on farm policy as elsewhere. 
In the House of Representatives, the agriculture committee chainnan, Pat Roberts, was a 
staunch defender of farm  supports but faced intense ideological ftre  from the new Republican 
majority.  His challenge was to ftnd a policy agenda that satisfted the rhetorical mandate both for 
budget constraint and policy reform, while simultaneously putting together a coalition inside his 
committee to pass a farm bill.  The "Freedom to Farm" proposal turned this trick.  It became the 
centerpiece of  his proposals when rising market prices created a situation in which the old policy 
mechanisms would fail  to  deliver  support-payment transfers  to  farmers  while  the  decoupled 
contract payments became relatively lucrative. 
Most participants in the farm bill debate were slower than Roberts to appreciate the short-
tenn ftnancial gains that could be obtained for farmers from the change in policy instruments to 
decoupled  support  payments.  Lacking  committee  support,  Senate  agriculture  committee 
chairman  Richard  Lugar  soon  abandoned  his  early  initiative  to  achieve  budget  savings  to 
8 For a summary of  the  farm bill debate and further interpretation of  the outcome see our papers 
"Can Farm Policy Be Refonned? Challenge of  the Freedom to Farm Act" (Choices, First Quarter 
1996), "A Farm Bill for Booming Commodity Markets," (Choices,  Second Quarter 1996) and 
"Explaining U.S. Farm Policy in 1996 and Beyond:  Changes of Party Control and Changing 
Market Conditions" (American Journal of  Agricultural Economies, December 1996). 
54 compromises demanded by more traditional members of  his own party.  Cotton and rice interests 
posed  sustained  challenges  to  the  reform  proposals  in  the  House  as  well.  In  the  partisan 
atmosphere after the  1994 elections, the  opposition Roberts faced  from  the  Republican vice-
chairman of  his committee created an historic gridlock on agricultural policy in September 1995. 
Notwithstanding the many intervening steps, the ultimate success of  the FAIR Act in April 1996 
marks the fIrst time ever that legislation included in a budget reconciliation bill without approval 
from  an  authorizing  committee  of jurisdiction  subsequently  has  become  law.  This  is  a 
remarkable tribute to Roberts' perceptive assessment of the policy environment of the farm bill 
debate and his skill in designing instruments to suite the prevailing opportunities. 
While the process of the  recent  farm  bill  debate has been historic,  the fmal  outcome 
brings only limited market-oriented reform.  The elimination of acreage set-asides and increased 
planting flexibility  the FAIR Act provides are  sensible reactions to  strong market conditions. 
The efficiency gains they provide (estimated at about 2-4 percent of farm income or $1-2 billion 
per year) yield economic benefIts for producers and consumers.  In addition, capping the level of 
expenditures on future farm programs is a plausible response to continuing budget pressure.  Full 
decoupling  of support  payments  from  prices  and  production  on  a  unilateral  basis  may  also 
enhance the bargaining position of the  United States as  it seeks more open markets in future 
international trade negotiations. 
Despite  these  accomplishments,  many  reforms  fell  by  the  wayside  in  the  process  of 
enacting the  1996  farm  bill.  Sugar and peanuts mostly escaped price reform.  The effort to 
deregulate  the  dairy  sector  largely  collapsed.  The  initial  loan-rate  and  payment-limitation 
reforms included in the House version of the budget reconciliation legislation were rescinded. 
Moreover,  budget  discipline  broke  down.  Decoupled  payments  and  planting  flexibility  are 
offered to  farmers  with a net short-term fIscal  cost.  Permanent legislation for  farm  support 
programs based on supply controls is maintained, and there is no guarantee that a transition to 
lower support for farmers has  been initiated.  Thus, regardless of the widely-used expressions 
55 about the new farm  bill bringing the end of farm  programs that have existed since the  Great 
Depression, the amount of  reform entailed seems less than historic. 
The outcome might, however, have been worse.  At one point, as market prices moved 
up, the expected cost of continuing the existing deficiency payment programs for the next few 
years equaled the capped expenditures to be guaranteed by the PFC contracts.  Extending the old 
programs  under  such  circumstances,  even  without  ARPs,  would  have  given  farmers  less 
production flexibility and would have failed to provide even the presumption of  a cap on future 
expenditures.  Worse yet, shifting to higher loan rates, as proposed by some Democrats, would 
have recoupled farm support interventions to production. 
Perhaps market-oriented reformers should count it lucky that the windfall payments that 
only the decoupled contract payments seemed to insure kept these other options from prevailing. 
However, by the time the FAIR Act finally passed, the budget projections suggested that it would 
have been substantially less costly to taxpayers in the short run to continue deficiency payments 
(especially with a doubling of nonpayment acres, as once proposed).  PFC contract payments to 
farmers  over the  next  two  years  are  likely  to  exceed  what  payments  would  have  been with 
continuation of 1990 law by $5-10 billion.  Perhaps the planting flexibility and elimination of 
set-asides that some farmers  sought (others opposed) could have been achieved without such a 
windfall transfer. 
High market prices created an  opportune time to end past farm  program interventions 
costlessly,  as  would have  resulted  from  the  initial  Lugar and  Farm  Freedom  Act  proposals. 
These proposals lacked serious political support.  One might argue that some windfall payments 
to farmers are a reasonable buyout for termination of sixty years of intervention policy.  But for 
the levels of  windfall gains now projected the likely payoff period for taxpayers is quite long if 
commodity prices remain high.  This raises the question of whether "Roberts' billions" are too 
high a price for some good farm policy. 
Indeed, it is ironic that the initial Freedom to Farm Act was originally sold to the reform-
minded  Republican  House  leadership  during  the  highly-partisan  budget  debate  because  it 
56 deregulated a large  part of agricultural  production and  disciplined fann entitlement spending. 
When the Republican budget initiative collapsed, a weakened version of  the original reforms was 
approved first by the Senate because of  bipartisan support for windfall payments, continuation of 
other fann policy interventions, reauthorization with full funding of  nutrition and environmental 
programs, and other added  spending.  The FAIR Act succeeded in the House when a similar 
coalition  involving  fann  and  conservation  interests  coalesced  around  it.  Thus,  in  the  end, 
political  support for  decoupled  PFC  payments  came  over the  objections  of Republican  (and 
other) reformers and opponents of lavish fann spending.  The  l04th Congress simply did not 
impose either the  reduced  expenditures  or reform of domestic  supply control  programs  once 
included as "negatives" on one side of  Roberts' policy ledger for the Republican agenda. 
What does this somewhat sobering reconstruction of  the political origins of  the FAIR Act 
tell  us  about  the  ability  of the  political  processes  to  sustain  reform  in  agriculture?  One 
conclusion is that fann legislation remains largely in the purview of commodity groups.  They 
were able to extract numerous concessions from the new reform-oriented Republican leadership 
despite  its  supposed  commitments  to  budget  discipline,  streamlined  government,  and 
deregulation. 
To  pass fann legislation, commodity groups have traditionally formed  an alliance with 
supporters of  conservation and nutrition programs.  Under a Republican-dominated Congress, the 
nutrition  constituencies  have  diminished  clout,  but  extension  of the  CRP  and  increased 
mandatory expenditures for conservation were easily approved over objections on grounds of 
budget discipline.
9  Nor could  Roberts  deliver the  relief from  environmental  mandates  and 
deregulation he had once promised on the "positive" side of  his policy ledger. 
Before the  Republicans  captured  control  of Congress  in  1994,  there  was  substantial 
discussion of the 1995 fann bill marking an advance for environmentally-justified programs of 
9  In August 1996, Congress passed a welfare reform bill that cut projected funding for food 
stamps and other nutrition programs substantially. The president signed the welfare bill over 
objections of  many Democrats. 
57 "green payments".  Speculation that the election results doomed such a new policy orientation 
have proven over stated.  Beneath the market-oriented rhetoric of the new Republican majority, 
and  even  in the  context of strong  world  markets,  supply  control justified on  environmental 
grounds and transfer payments based on environmental practices are percolating as rationales for 
retaining a  "social contract" of government involvement in agriculture.  A transition may  be 
occurring to the era of "green payments," with a one-time delay for pure income transfers the 
temporary "Freedom to Farm" legacy. 
A related and crucial observation to make from the 1994-1996 farm policy debate is the 
extent to which policy outcomes are dependent on short-term market conditions.  In the early 
stages of  the debate, continuation of  past support programs in some form seemed the most likely 
policy outcome.  At one point, the Senate agriculture committee had approved such a bill, the 
administration  supported  the  traditional  approach,  and  the  House  agriculture  committee  was 
deadlocked over the Freedom to Farm alternative.  The perception that past policies would be 
continued began to falter as market prices increased.  This led to the decision by the House-
Senate  budget  conference  committee  to  endorse  decoupled  payments  over  the  deficiency 
payments  in  the  Senate  bill--a decision  that  surprised  many  observers.  The  existing  policy 
equilibrium  continued to  lose  adherents,  and  Freedom  to  Farm  payments  continued  to  gain 
momentum, as the short-term advantage they offered grew and was increasingly recognized.  By 
the end, the debate over the decoupled PFC payments was essentially settled, while the details of 
what "add-ons" would be needed to insure their approval continued to be negotiated. 
The point, of course, is that policy being driven by market conditions is by no means the 
same as policy being driven by market liberalization.  It is hard to imagine any policy having 
been endorsed in 1996 that did not respond to low commodity stocks and high prices by giving 
farmers full production capacity and flexibility in the short run.  The corn ARP imposed in 1995, 
and the advance deficiency payments made on the basis of low price projections were policy 
mistakes, ex post, that were not to be immediately repeated. 
58 This  is  not  necessarily  reassuring  from  the  perspective  of the  ability  of the  political 
process to sustain reform of agricultural policy.  For the FAIR Act to be counted as reform the 
deregulation of production and  payment limits  it provides for  the  feedgrains,  wheat,  rice  and 
cotton  will  have  to  stick  when  market  prices  fall.  Reform  skeptics  may  imagine  that  the 
generous transition payments windfall,  coming  on  top  of high market prices,  will  encourage 
farmers  to  expand production capacity.  If commodity prices  subsequently fall,  perhaps after 
1997, the result could be a "hard landing"  for  crop producers, rather than a smooth transition 
toward market orientation.  Rather than a weakening of demands for public support by the farm 
lobby, those demands could be strengthened.  The Democratic proponents of a long-term safety 
net  for  farmers  were  vociferous  in  their  objections  to  the  lack of price-risk  insurance  under 
decoupled  payments.  They  are  poised  to  jump back  into  the  farm  policy  debate  if market 
conditions turn sour.  Agricultural interests, who have now proven adept at obtaining benefits 
from  Congress under either party,  will  find  willing  defenders of renewed  intervention should 
prices fall.  Even if the Republican leadership were to resist (assuming it still is the leadership), 
defections among Republican agriculturalists could easily create a bipartisan juggernaut. 
Hopeful  reformers  must imagine  quite  a different  result.  If the reforms  stick even  if 
prices were to fall, the new legislation could signal less government intervention than equivalent 
market circumstances have in the past, with reduced future farm payments.  The reforms will be 
more substantive in these circumstances, even if it is still many years before taxpayers recouped 
the extra up-front outlays mandated for farmers by the 104th Congress.  Moreover, the transition 
payments  windfall  guaranteed  by  the  new  farm  bill  may  becomes  an  effective  buyout  of a 
substantial  component  of the  farm  coalition,  despite  its  political  origins  from  within  this 
coalition.  Perhaps farmers who find unexpected benefits from planting flexibility will resist new 
regulation.  Or perhaps having accepted the generous (and decoupled) PFC contract payments, 
producers of field crops will weaken the political foundation from which to demand a return to 
traditional  supports,  or (despite  retention of the  permanent  law)  from  which  to  demand  any 
support at all after 2002.  Were crop producers to be bought out of the farm coalition, it could 
59 eventually prove more difficult, in contrast to events of 1995-96, to logroll continued protection 
for dairy, sugar and peanuts.  Under this scenario, hopeful reformers can imagine the FAIR Act 
easing agriculture into an era of  greater market orientation. 
60 Appendix:  Provisions of  the 1996 FAIR Act 
TITLE I-AGRICULTURAL  Income support is no longer related to market prices.  Restrictions on acreage 
MARKET TRANSITION  and crops planted are substantially reduced.  The nonrecourse loan program 
ACT  with marketing loan provisions continues, subject to maximum loan rates. 
Permanent law of  the AgricuItural Adjustment Act of 1938 and the 
Agricultural Act of 1949 is retained but temporarily suspended.  A 
commission is established to make recommendations about the appropriate 
future role of  the Federal government in production agriculture. 
Income support for feed grains,  Farmers who have participated in the support programs in anyone of  the past 
wheat, cotton and rice  5 years can enter into 7-year production flexibility contracts (PFCs) for 1996-
2002.  Total PFC payment levels for each fiscal year are fIXed at: $5.6 billion 
in 1996, $5.4 billion in 1997, $5.8 billion in 1998, $5.6 billion in 1999, $5.1 
billion in 2000, $4.1 billion in 200  1, and $4.0 billion in 2002.  Allocations of 
the payments are: 26.26% for wheat, 46.22% for com, 5.11 % for sorghum, 
2.16% for barley, 0.15% for oats, 11.63% for upland cotton, and 8.47% for 
rice. 
Land eligible for PFCs is equal to a farm's base acreage for 1996 calculated 
under the previous support programs, plus any returning Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) base and less any CRP enrollment.  Program 
payment yields are frozen at 1995 levels.  Sign-up for PFCs was restricted to 
one period in 1996, except that land from expiring CRP contracts can be 
enrolled later.  A per-unit payment rate for each contract commodity will be 
detennined annually by dividing the total annual contract payment level for 
each commodity by the total of  all contract program payment production. 
Planting flexibility and  Land must be maintained in agricultural use. Participants may plant 100 
restrictions  percent of  their total contract acreage to any crop, except planting of  fruits 
and vegetables (excluding mung beans, lentils, and dry peas) is restricted. 
Unlimited haying and grazing and planting and harvesting of  alfalfa and 
other forage crops are permitted with no reduction in payments. 
Authority for ARP's is eliminated.  The 0/85/92 and 50/85/92 programs are 
also eliminated. 
Price Support  Nonrecourse loans are extended.  Any production of  a contract commodity 
(Loan Rates)  by a producer who has entered into a PFC is eligible for loans.  Marketing 
loan provisions are continued allowing repayment of  loans at less than full 
principal plus interest when prices are below loan rates.  Loan deficiency 
payments are available for all loan commodities except extra long staple 
(ELS) cotton.  Authority for the Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) is suspended. 
Feed grains and Wheat  Loan rates are set at 85% of  the 5-year Olympic average offarm prices, 
subject to a maximum of  $1.89/bu for com and $2.58/bu for wheat.  The 
Secretary retains authority to decrease feed grain and wheat loan rates up to 
10 percent based on the projected stocks-to-use ratio but authority for an 
additional 10010 discretionary adjustment is repealed.  Loan rates for grain 
sorghum, barley, and oats are set based on the feed value relative to com. 
Rye is no longer eligible for price support. 
61 Cotton  The loan rate for upland cotton is set at the lesser of  S5% of  the 5-year 
Olympic average of  spot market prices, or 90% of  the Northern Europe-
based average price, subject to a maximum of  SO.5 192/lb and a minimum of 
SO.50/lb.  Provisions for various adjustment mechanisms and import quotas 
are maintained but certain reforms are made to the cotton loan program, 
including elimination of  the S-month cottong loan extension.  Total 
expenditures for upland cotton user marketing certificates (Step 2 payments) 
cannot exceed S701 million over FY 1995-2002. 
Rice  The rice loan rate is S6.50 per cwt. 
Oilseeds and Soybeans  The soybean loan rate is set at not less than S5% of  the 5-year Olympic 
average of  farm prices, subject to a maximum of  S5.26/bu and a minimum of 
S $4.92/bu.  The loan rates for sunflower seed, canola, rapeseed, safflower, 
mustard seed, and flaxseed cannot be less than S5 percent of  the Olympic 
average of  farm prices for sunflower seed, subject to a maximum of 
SO.093/lb and a minimum ofSO.S7/lb. 
Conservation compliance  Participants must continue to maintain conservation plans including 
compliance with highly erodible land conservation provisions and wetland 
conservation provisions (swampbuster) to receive contract payments. 
Payment limitations  Individual farmers can receive up to SSO,OOO per year in total contract 
payments on 3 separate farming operations ($40,000 on the fIrst operation 
and S20,000 each on 2 additional entities).  Limits on marketing loan gains 
continue at S75,000 on the fIrst farm and S37,500 each on 2 additional 
entities. 
Crop insurance  Purchase of  crop insurance is no longer required to be eligible for farm 
program benefIts if  producers waive all emergency crop loss assistance. 
Revenue Insurance Pilot  Requires a revenue insurance pilot program for crop years 1997-2000.  Also 
Program  authorizes research through pilot programs to determine if  futures and 
options contracts can provide protection from fInancial risks. 
Dairy  The minimum support price for milk maintained through government 
Price support  purchases of  butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese declines from SI0.35/cwt in 
1996 to S9.9O in 1999, then is eliminated.  Budget assessment on dairy 
producers are eliminated immediately.  Starting in 2000, a recourse loan 
program is implemented for butter, nonfat fry milk, and cheese at loan rates 
equivalent to S9.90/cwt.  Retains import tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) with no 
change. 
Federal milk marketing orders  Federal milk marketing orders are to be consolidated from 33 into 10-14. 
Multiple basing points for the pricing of  milk are authorized, California may 
maintain its own fluik milk standards, and the Secretary may, upon the 
fInding of  a compelling public interest in the area, grant the New England 
region the authority to enter into a dairy compact to terminate with the 
implementation of  Federal order reforms. 
62 Peanuts  The peanut program is revised to operate at  "no-net-cost" to taxpayers.  The 
Price support  quota support rate for domestic sales is frozen at $61 Olton, reduced from 
$678 in 1995. 
Domestic Quota  The minimum national quota and provisions for carryover of  under-
marketings are eliminated.  Out-of-state nonfarmers cannot hold quotas, but 
limited sale, lease, and transfer of  quota is permitted across county lines 
within a state. 
Sugar  No-net-cost provisions and its associated TRQ for imports are retained.  The 
Price support  raw cane and refmed beet sugar loan rate remain fIXed at the 1995 levels of 
$O.l8/lb and $0.229/lb, respectively.  Loans are recourse when the level of 
the TRQ is at or below 1.5 million short tons (raw value); if  the TRQ is 
raised above that level, loans become nonrecourse. 
Marketing allotments  Authority for domestic marketing allotments is eliminated. 
TITLE ll-AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE 
Food Aid  Extends the authority for P.L. 480 and Food for Progress (FFP) agreements. 
Food Security Commodity  Amends the Agricultural Act of 1980 to establish a 4-million-ton Food 
Reserve  Security Commodity Reserve expanded to include com, grain, sorghum, and 
rice in addition to wheat. 
Export Credit Guarantee (GSM)  Mandates GSM-I02 and GSM-I03 at $5.5 billion annually.  Allows credit 
Programs  guarantees for high-value products with at least 90% U.S. content (by 
weight). 
Emerging Markets Program  Requires that CCC make available not less than $1  billion of  direct credit or 
credit guarantees to emerging markets during FY 1996-2002. 
The Market Promotion Program  Authorizes funding for the program at $90 million annually and changes the 
(MPP)  name Market Access Program (MAP). 
Export Subsidies  The Export Enhancement Program (EEP) expenditures are capped at $350 
million in FY 1996, $250 million in 1997, $500 million in 1998, $550 
million in 1999, $579 million in 2000, and $478 million in 2001 and 2002. 
The 1996-99 values total $1.6 billion less than UR-GA  IT  commitments. 
The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) is extended to 2002.  The 
Secretary must authorize subsidies sufficient to export the maximum volume 
of  dairy products allowable subject to UR-GA  IT  limits. 
Embargo compensation  Assures producers of  compensation if  a future export embargo is imposed on 
any country for national security or foreign policy reasons, and if  no other 
country with an agricultural economic interest joins the U.S. sanctions within 
90 days. 
63 TITLE m- CONSERVATION 
Highly erodible land  Conservation compliance provisions are retained.  Producers are allowed to 
modify their practices if  the modifications will provide greater erosion 
control. 
Swampbuster  USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service is designated the lead 
agency in wetlands delineation (as well as regulation of  grazing lands). 
Existing wetland delineations remain valid unless a producer requests a 
review. 
Conservation Reserve Program  Maximum CRP area is capped at 36.4 million acres.  The Secretary can 
(CRP)  enroll new land in the CRP to replace expiring acreage.  New acreage will 
have to meet higher criteria regarding environment and conservation benefits 
to be accepted.  With 60 days' notice, farmers can remove land enrolled for 5 
years from the CRP prior to contract expiration.  Wetlands, highly erodible 
land. and other environmentally sensitive areas are not eligible for early 
release. 
Wetlands Reserve Program  WRP area is maintained at 975,000 acres, to be split equally among 
(WRP)  permanent easements, 30-year easements, and restoration cost-share 
agreements. 
Environmental Quality  EQIP is authorized at $1.3 billion over 7 years to assist producers with 
Incentives Program (EQIP)  environmental and conservation improvements, with at least half of  the 
funding is for environmental concerns associated with livestock production. 
The program awards 5- to 100year cost-share or incentive payment contracts. 
Other Programs  Conservation farm option contracts, National Natural Resources 
Conservation Foundation (NNRCF), Grazing Lands Conservation Initiative 
(GLCI), Flood Risk Reduction Program, Wildlife Habitat Incentives 
Program, and a Farmland Protection Program are established.  The Secretary 
may designate watersheds or regions of  special environmental sensitivity as 
conservation priority areas eligible for enhanced assistance. 
Everglades Agricultural Area  Provides $200 million from the U.S. Treasury (not CCC funds) to the 
Secretary of  Interior to conduct restoration activities, which may include land 
acquisition, in the Everglades ecosystem.  An additional $100 million worth 
of  Federal land in Florida may be sold or swapped for land in the Everglades. 
TITLE IV-NUTRITION  The Food Stamp Program is reauthorizes for 2 years.  The commodity 
ASSISTANCE  distribution programs, and Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program 
(TEF  AP) are reauthorized. 
TITLE V-AGRICULTURAL  Authorizes producer-funded research and promotion programs for canola and 
PROMOTIONS  rapeseed, kiwifruit, and popcorn.  Extends existing promotion program for 
fluid milk. 
64 TITLE VI-CREDIT  Fann loan programs administered by USDA's Fann Service Agency are 
reauthorized.  Authority to make loans for most nonagricultural purposes is 
repealed, and new restrictions on emergency loans are invoked.  Borrowers 
with delinquent accounts face tighter rules. 
The Fann Credit System Reform Act of  February 1996 streamlines the 
regulation of  the FCS and reforms the Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation.  Under the FAIR Act, the Secretary is required to conduct a 
study for Congress on rural credit. 
TITLE VB-RURAL  Existing programs are consolidated.  A new Rural Community Advancement 
DEVELOPMENT  Program (RCAP), is authorized.  The renamed Alternative Agricultural 
Research and Commercialization Corporation has enhanced abilities to 
fmance new industrial uses for agricultural products,  funding authorized for 
water and waste facility grants is increased to $590 million, and programs for 
telemedicine and distance learning services are reauthorized.  A new Fund 
for Rural America is established to augment existing resources for 
agriCUltural research and rural development.  Funding is authorized from the 
CCC for $50 million in FY 1996, $100 million in FY 1997, and $150 million 
in FY 1998. 
TITLE VIII-RESEARCH,  Provides specific authorizations in FY 1996 and 1997 for Federal agricultural 
EXTENSION, AND  research, extension, and education programs.  Broad authorization for all 
EDUCATION  programs is provided subject to appropriations for fiscal years 1998-2002.  A 
task force is authorized to consider the development and consolidation of 
federally supported agricultural research facilities, and a National 
Agricultural Research, Extension, Education, and Economics Advisory 
Board is established (replaces 3 separate advisory committees). 
Source:  Condensed from Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of  Agriculture. 
Agricultural Outlook:  Special Farm Bill Supplement, April 1996. 
65 